Spyware and the Limits of Surveillance Law by Bellia, Patricia L.




Spyware and the Limits of Surveillance Law
Patricia L. Bellia
Notre Dame Law School, patricia.l.bellia.2@nd.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship
Part of the Internet Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by
an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Patricia L. Bellia, Spyware and the Limits of Surveillance Law, 20 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1283 (2005).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/42
SPYWARE AND THE LIMITS OF
SURVEILLANCE LAW
By Patida L Belliat
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRO DUCTION ..................................................................................................... 1283
II. UNDERSTANDING THE ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE LAW FRAMEWORK .............. 1286
A . The W iretap A ct .......................................................................................... 1288
B. The Stored Comm unications Act ................................................................ 1291
C . The Pen/Trap Statute ................................................................................... 1295
III. THE CHALLENGES OF APPLYING SURVEILLANCE LAW TO SPYWARE ................... 1298
A . The Technology at Issue .............................................................................. 1298
B . The W iretap A ct .......................................................................................... 1301
1. The "Interception " Problem ................................................................ 1301
2. The "Consent" Problem ...................................................................... 1305
3. The "Content" Problem ....................................................................... 1311
4. Sum m ary .............................................................................................. 13 12
C. The Stored Comm unications Act ................................................................ 1313
1. The "F acility " Problem ....................................................................... 1313
2. The "Authorization" and "Consent" Problems ................................... 1314
3. The "Electronic Storage" Problem ...................................................... 1315
4. Sum m ary .............................................................................................. 13 16
D . C onclusion ................................................................................................... 13 17
IV . SURVEILLANCE LAW 'S LIM ITS ............................................................................. 1318
A. The Spyware Problem in Context ................................................................ 1319
B. Deconstructing Courts' "Privacy-Protective" Approaches .......................... 1325
1. United States v. Sm ith .......................................................................... 1325
2. In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litigation and its Antecedents ............ 1331
3. Theofel v. Farey-Jones ......................................................................... 1335
C. The Unraveling of Privacy-Protective Approaches ..................................... 1338
D. The Impetus for Legislative Change ........................................................... 1342
V . C ON CLU SION ........................................................................................................ 1343
I. INTRODUCTION
Electronic surveillance law remains a weapon of choice for policy-
makers, litigants, and commentators seeking to address the threats digital
technology poses for privacy. The controversy over how best to respond to
the "spyware" problem provides only the most recent illustration of that
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phenomenon.' Federal surveillance statutes bar the unauthorized acquisi-
tion of electronic communications and related data in some circum-
stances.2 Although there is much debate over how to define "spyware,"
3
that label encompasses at least some software that monitors a computer
user's electronic communications. Surveillance statutes thus present an
intuitive fit for responding to the regulatory challenges of spyware. In-
deed, those who argue that no new federal legislation is needed to address
the spyware problem rely in part on the opportunities that surveillance
statutes and related doctrines provide for criminal prosecution and civil
suits.
4
A recent report issued by the staff of the Federal Trade Commission,
for example, suggests that the Department of Justice "has statutory author-
ity to prosecute distributors of software products, such as spyware, in
cases where consumers' privacy or security is- compromised.",5 That ob-
servation was based in part on testimony of Justice Department officials at
a day-long FTC workshop held in April 2004. The Justice Department de-
nied that the absence of specific spyware legislation had impeded law en-
forcement efforts in any way.6 As one official noted, "we have in our
1. A recent report of the staff of the Federal Trade Commission provides a flavor
of the debate. See FED'L TRADE COMM'N STAFF REPORT, SPYWARE WORKSHOP: MONI-
TORING SOFTWARE ON YOUR PC: SPYWARE, ADWARE, AND OTHER SOFTWARE (2005),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2005/03/050307spywarept.pdf [hereinafter FTC
STAFF REPORT].
2. See 18 U.S.C. § 251 l(l)(a) (2000) (prohibiting "intercept[ion]" of communica-
tions); id. § 2701(a) (barring one from gaining unauthorized access to facility of service
provider and thereby "obtain[ing], alter[ing], or prevent[ing] authorized access" to com-
munications in electronic storage).
3. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 109-32, at 10 (2005) (report of Committee on Energy
and Commerce, noting that the committee "received testimony that spyware represents a
range of software programs on a broad continuum from the most pernicious criminal ac-
tivities on one end to the less threatening but still intrusive on the opposite end of the
spectrum"); FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 3 ("Panelists generally agreed that
reaching an industry consensus on one definition [of spyware] has been elusive because
of the technical complexity and dynamic nature of software.").
4. The Senate and the House have debated various spyware proposals over the last
two years; most recently, the House overwhelmingly passed two dramatically different
versions of spyware legislation in May of 2005. See Securely Protect Yourself Against
Cyber Trespass Act (SPY ACT), H.R. 29, 109th Cong. (2005); Internet Spyware (I-SPY)
Prevention Act, H.R. 744, 109th Cong. (2005). Both bills were passed on May 23, 2005,
H.R. 29 by a margin of 393-4 and H.R. 744 by a margin of 395-1. See 151 CONG. REC.
H3744 (daily ed. May 23, 2005). For a discussion of disagreement over the need for new
legislation, see FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 22.
5. FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 21.
6. See FED'L TRADE COMM'N WORKSHOP TRANSCRIPT: MONITORING SOFTWARE
ON YOUR PC: SPYWARE, ADWARE, AND OTHER SOFTWARE 261 (Apr. 19, 2004), available
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quiver a number of arrows that we can use in prosecution."7 Justice De-
partment officials testified at the FTC workshop that some forms of spy-
ware, such as devices and software designed to capture keystrokes, could
violate the principal federal electronic surveillance statute-Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968-which prohibits
the "intercept[ion]" of communications, including electronic communica-
tions.8 Other commentators have suggested that spyware may also impli-
cate a separate electronic surveillance statute limiting access to stored
communications .
9
As the debate on the need for new federal legislation proceeds, how-
ever, there is good reason to believe that federal electronic surveillance
statutes can combat only the most extreme forms of spyware. Electronic
surveillance law does not apply by any reasonable construction to most
forms of spyware. Moreover, the overall record on application of surveil-
lance law statutes to a variety of digital-age problems is in fact quite
mixed. Courts have reached aggressive privacy-protective outcomes on
very bad facts, but they have also let seemingly problematic practices pass
unsanctioned.
The difficulty with efforts to apply surveillance law statutes to new
privacy problems is that our federal electronic surveillance statutes are
emphatically not comprehensive data privacy statutes. They may wrongly
be perceived as such, particularly by victims of spyware and related pri-
vacy threats. The mismatch between the statutes and the goal of protect-
ing online privacy has created a body of confused-even incoherent-case
law. To that extent, it diverts attention from important policy questions,
including whether Congress should consider legislative solutions tailored
at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/spyware/transcript.pdf (comments of Mark Ecken-
wiler, Deputy Chief, Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, Department of
Justice) [hereinafter FTC WORKSHOP TRANSCRIPT].
7. Id.
8. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (2000); see FTC WORKSHOP TRANSCRIPT, supra note 6,
at 260 (comments of Mark Eckenwiler). Justice Department testimony also focused on
various prongs of the federal computer crime statute, known as the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act (CFAA), 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000 & Supp. II 2002). See FTC WORKSHOP
TRANSCRIPT, supra note 6, at 259-60 (comments of Mark Eckenwiler). CFAA claims
often go hand-in-hand with claims under the surveillance statutes, but because the CFAA
is not technically a surveillance statute, I discuss it only briefly. See infra note 168 and
accompanying text.
9. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2709, 2711-2712 (2000 & Supp. II 2002); see FTC STAFF
REPORT, supra note 1, at 35 n.206 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711); CENTER FOR DE-
MOCRACY & TECHNOLOGY, GHOSTS IN OUR MACHINES: BACKGROUND AND POLICY PRO-
POSALS ON THE "SPYWARE" PROBLEM 10 n.12 (Nov. 2003), available at http://www
.cdt.org/privacy/031100spyware.pdf (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712).
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to specific privacy threats (such as spyware) or whether broader data pri-
vacy statutes are necessary or appropriate. In other words, we might be
better off if courts and commentators would simply make surveillance
law's limits plain.
This Article uses the difficulties of applying electronic surveillance
law statutes to spyware to illustrate the broader limits of surveillance law.
Part II provides an overview of the electronic surveillance framework. Part
III considers the interpretive issues that have arisen and that are likely to
arise as litigants and courts seek to apply the federal statutes to various
types of spyware. Current case law suggests that electronic surveillance
statutes are likely to constrain only the most egregious forms of spy-
ware-and there may even be some difficulties in surveillance law per-
forming that limited task. Efforts to use surveillance law to create more
privacy-sensitive industry practices are likely to fail altogether.
The constructions of the law that I offer in Part III may be controver-
sial, partly because surveillance law is sufficiently unstable that there is
room for courts to adopt approaches that are more privacy-protective. In
Part IV, I consider whether courts should use surveillance law to respond
more aggressively to privacy challenges such as spyware. Drawing upon
case law from other contexts, I show that there are good reasons to be
wary of using surveillance law as a vehicle for addressing various infor-
mation privacy problems. Indeed, if electronic surveillance cases were to
plainly expose the limits of surveillance law, they would generate a more
fruitful legislative debate about the propriety of true data privacy legisla-
tion, whether broadly or narrowly conceived.
II. UNDERSTANDING THE ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
LAW FRAMEWORK
In this Part, I introduce three statutes that form the federal electronic
surveillance law framework:' 0 Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968 (also known as "Title III" or the "Wiretap
10. The electronic surveillance landscape also includes another important statute:
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1863 (West 2000
& Supp. 2005). That statute authorizes surveillance to gather "foreign intelligence infor-
mation," defined in part to include information that relates to the ability of the United
States to protect against an attack or other hostile acts by a foreign power. Id. § 1801(e).
Because I am primarily concerned with legal authorities that constrain private parties'
conduct, I do not discuss FISA, which regulates only conduct undertaken "under color of
law." See id. § 1809(a). For further discussion of FISA, see Patricia L. Bellia, The "Lone
Wolf" Amendment and the Future of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 50 VILL. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2005).
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Act");'1 the segment of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(ECPA) limiting access to stored communications (also known as the
"Stored Communications Act (SCA)"); 12 and the provisions governing the
use of "pen registers" and "trap and trace devices"-that is, devices de-
signed to acquire source and destination information associated with
communications.
13
Before exploring the electronic surveillance framework, it is useful to
define "electronic surveillance" and to discuss one shortcoming of that
phrase. By "electronic surveillance," I mean techniques that historically
have involved the use of certain electronic or mechanical devices to ac-
quire the contents of communications and identifying data associated with
them. The term "electronic" in "electronic surveillance," then, refers to the
technique used in the surveillance, not to the type of communication ac-
quired through the technique. Wiretapping (attaching a device to a tele-
phone wire to acquire the contents of a telephone communication) and
eavesdropping (installing a device to transmit or record a conversation) are
two electronic surveillance techniques. The Wiretap Act, the principal
modem federal surveillance statute, was originally designed to regulate
those techniques. As discussed below, technological developments neces-
sitated an expansion of the Wiretap Act to encompass more modem meth-
ods of communication.
The phrase "electronic surveillance" is also something of a misnomer.
The term "surveillance" is ordinarily used to describe the government's
acquisition of information about its citizens. Indeed, all three of the federal
statutes discussed below were primarily passed in response to, or designed
to take account of, Supreme Court decisions addressing the legality under
the Fourth Amendment of government sur~eillance activities. Each statute,
however, also regulates private conduct. For purposes of understanding
11. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351,
tit. III, §§ 801-804, 82 Stat. 197, 211-23 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522
(2000 & Supp. II 2002)). I dislike the term "Wiretap Act," because the statute covers not
only "wiretapping'--that is, acquisition of the contents of wire communications through
use of an electronic or mechanical device-but also the acquisition of oral and electronic
communications. It is nevertheless difficult to avoid using it, because it appears in many
of the cases that I discuss. When describing provisions of the statute under which gov-
ernment officials seek court authorization to conduct surveillance activities, however, I
generally refer to "Title III" orders, in keeping with government practice.
12. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508,
§§ 201-202, 100 Stat. 1848, 1860-68 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2709,
2711-2712 (2000 & Supp. 112002)).
13. See id. § 301, 100 Stat. at 1868-73 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-
3127 (2000 & Supp. 112002)).
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how, if at all, surveillance statutes constrain the distribution or use of spy-
ware, we are primarily interested in the scope of the statutory prohibitions
on private conduct. Because each statute to some extent accommodated a
Supreme Court decision addressing government surveillance activities,
however, it is impossible to understand the structure and terminology of
each statute without understanding the Fourth Amendment limitations on
government conduct.
I discuss the Wiretap Act, the Stored Communications Act, and the
pen register and trap and trace provisions in turn. With respect to each
statute, I identify the key interpretive issues that are likely to arise in at-
tempts to apply the statute to the spyware problem.
A. The Wiretap Act
In adopting the Wiretap Act in 1968, Congress prohibited the "inter-
cept[ion]" of certain communications. 14 Although the statute was the
product of several years of legislative efforts to regulate wiretapping and
eavesdropping activities, 15 two cases decided by the Supreme Court in
1967 provided the immediate impetus for the statute's passage.
In 1928, the Supreme Court held in Olmstead v. United States16 that
the government's use of a wiretapping device would not violate the Fourth
Amendment unless government agents trespassed onto private property to
install the device. 17 Congress responded in 1934 by outlawing wiretapping
by private or governmental entities,' 8 but these proscriptions were widely
disregarded. 19 More than three decades later, as Congress weighed various
statutory proposals to revise the prohibition on wiretapping and to add a
prohibition on eavesdropping, the Supreme Court decided two key cases
that would shape the legislativ6 effort. First, in Berger v. New York,2° the
Court invalidated a New York statute setting forth requirements under
14. 18 U.S.C. § 251 l(l)(a) (2000).
15. See AMERICAN BAR ASS'N PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE app. E (Tentative Draft,
1968) (cataloguing congressional hearings); S. RP. No. 90-1097, at 134 (1968), as re-
printed in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2223 (individual views of Sen. Long and Sen. Hart)
(noting that Congress had debated bills addressing wiretapping and eavesdropping activi-
ties for forty years).
16. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
17. Id. at 466.
18. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 652, § 605, 48 Stat. 1103 (codified as amended at 47
U.S.C. § 605 (2000)).
19. See Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of the Wire-
tap Act, 56 ALA. L. REV. 9, 12 (2004).
20. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
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which a judge could authorize law enforcement officials to use listening
devices. Because the case involved a listening device that had been placed
in an office after a "trespassory intrusion," the Court applied the Fourth
Amendment notwithstanding its conclusion in Olmstead.2 1 The Fourth
Amendment requirements identified in Berger ultimately provided a blue-
print for federal legislation.22 Second, in Katz v. United States,23 the Court
abandoned its prior focus on trespass as the trigger for applicability of the
Fourth Amendment. The Katz Court held that the Fourth Amendment does
not simply protect against government intrusions into physical areas in
which an individual has a property interest: "[O]nce it is recognized that
the Fourth Amendment protects people-and not simply 'areas'-against
unreasonable searches and seizures, it becomes clear that the reach of that
Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intru-
sion into any given enclosure. 24 Because the government's activities "in
electronically listening to and recording [Katz's] words violated the pri-
vacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth,"
the government's conduct amounted to a search.25
These two decisions brought a new sense of urgency to the legislative
debate, because they essentially outlawed all wiretapping and eavesdrop-
ping activities by federal and state officials not conducted in conformity
with the Fourth Amendment requirements outlined in Berger. The Wiretap
Act reflected Congress's attempt to broadly regulate electronic surveil-
lance by outlawing such activities by both private parties and government
officials and excepting certain law enforcement conduct from the prohibi-
tion.26
The Wiretap Act provides for criminal penalties and civil damages
against anyone who "intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or
procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept" any cov-
ered communication. 2 7 To "intercept" a communication is to use "any
electronic, mechanical, or other device" to acquire its contents.28 As
passed in 1968, the Wiretap Act covered "wire communications," defined
21. Id. at 44.
22. See Patricia L. Bellia, Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw's Lens, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 1375, 1389-90 (2004); Freiwald, supra note 19, at 25.
23. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
24. Id. at 353.
25. Id.
26. See 18 U.S.C. § 251 l(l)(a) (2000) (outlawing interception by "any person"); id.
§ 2518 (setting forth procedures for government officials to request court authorization
for electronic surveillance activities).
27. Id. § 2511(1)(a).
28. Id. § 2510(4).
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to include a communication "made in whole or in part through the use of
facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable,
or other like connection," 29 and "oral communications," defined to include
a communication "uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such
communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justify-
ing such expectation."3 ° In 1986, in ECPA,3 1 Congress extended the Wire-
tap Act's coverage to "electronic communications," defined in part as
"any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelli-
gence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, elec-
tromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate
or foreign commerce."
32
As will become clear, the Wiretap Act presents a number of difficult
interpretive issues. First, the statute defines the term "intercept" to include
the "aural or other acquisition of the contents of a communication" 33 -but
the definition does not specify whether acquisition of a communication
must occur contemporaneously with its transmission in order to qualify as
an interception, or whether acquisition of stored communications would
also qualify. That issue is among the most frequently litigated under the
Wiretap Act, both with respect to government and private conduct,34 and
is likely to arise in the spyware context as well. Second, in addition to
permitting authorized government conduct, the Wiretap Act exempts con-
duct undertaken with the "consent" of a party to the intercepted communi-
cation.35 The consent exception essentially preserves a line of cases pre-
29. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (2000 & Supp. II 2002). When Congress revised the Wire-
tap Act in 1986 by passing ECPA, it distinguished wire communications from electronic
communications by amending the wire communication definition to refer to an "aural
transfer," a term further defined as a transfer "containing the human voice." 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(18) (2000). In addition, ECPA altered the wire communication definition to in-
clude "any electronic storage of such communication." Id. § 2510(1). That portion of the
definition was excised by the USA Patriot Act. See Uniting and Strengthening America
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PA-
TRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 209, 115 Stat. 272, 283 [hereinafter USA
PATRIOT Act]. For further discussion, see infra notes 198-206, 290-293 and accompa-
nying text.
30. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (2000).
31. Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 101, 100 Stat. 1848, 1848 (1986).
32. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12).
33. Id. § 2510(4).
34. See, e.g., Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 113-14 (3d Cir.
2003); Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir. 1994);
Wesley Coll. v. Pitts, 974 F. Supp. 375, 388 (D. Del. 1997); Bohach v. City of Reno, 932
F. Supp. 1232, 1236 (D. Nev. 1996); United States v. Reyes, 922 F. Supp. 818, 837
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); see also infra notes 183-189, 194-229, 281-293 and accompanying text.
35. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c), (d) (2000).
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dating the Wiretap Act's passage in which the Supreme Court upheld the
introduction into evidence of communications recorded or transmitted to
the government by an undercover agent or informant. 36 The Court reaf-
firmed these cases after its decision in Katz, concluding that the Fourth
Amendment does not prevent a party to a conversation from revealing its
contents to the government, because a defendant has no "constitutionally
protected expectation that a person with whom he is conversing will not
then or later reveal the conversation to the police. 37 The Wiretap Act
permits a person "acting under color of law" to intercept a communication
where the person is a party to the communication or another party has
given prior consent.38 In the case of purely private conduct, the Act per-
mits a person to intercept a communication where the person is a party or
where a party has given prior consent, so long as the communication is not
intercepted "for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act."
39
Each of these interpretive issues-what it means to "intercept" a
communication and when an interception is consensual and thus not
unlawful-will present challenges for the application of the Wiretap Act
to spyware. I discuss these issues further in Part III.
B. The Stored Communications Act
As previously noted, the Wiretap Act initially prohibited only the in-
terception of wire and oral communications. The extension of the Wiretap
Act to electronic communications in 1986 was part of a larger effort to
update surveillance law to account for the increasing use of electronic
communications.
In particular, Congress recognized that systems allowing for the
transmission and receipt of electronic communications necessarily in-
volved the storage of such communications.40 During hearings on how
36. See, e.g., Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966) (admitting recording
taped by government informant and concluding that case involved "not... surreptitious
surveillance of a private conversation by an outsider, but ... the use by one party of a
device to make an accurate record of a conversation"); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S.
293, 302 (1966) (declining to suppress government informant's testimony because Fourth
Amendment does not protect "a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to whom he
voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it"); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S.
427, 439 (1963) (holding that evidence derived from a conversation recorded by a gov-
ernment agent was admissible).
37. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971) (plurality opinion); see United
States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 750-51 (1979) (following White).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (2000).
39. Id. § 2511(2)(d).
40. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 99-541, at 8 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3555, 3562 (describing e-mail systems); H.R. REP. No. 99-647, at 22 (1986) (same).
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Congress should update surveillance law, industry representatives empha-
sized that the development of electronic communication services necessar-
ily depended upon Congress providing a degree of statutory protection for
stored communications.4' Quite apart from the need to protect stored
communications against intrusions by private parties, Supreme Court case
law cast doubt upon whether stored communications were entitled to any
Fourth Amendment protection against government acquisition.
42
In United States v. Miller,43 the Supreme Court weighed a defendant's
Fourth Amendment challenge to the government's use of a subpoena to
obtain certain records from the defendant's banks. The defendant moved
to suppress the records on the ground that the Fourth Amendment required
a search warrant. The Court held that because the defendant had voluntar-
ily conveyed the items in question-including checks, financial state-
ments, and deposit slips-to the banks, he had no legitimate expectation of
privacy in the documents' contents.4a
A broad reading of Miller would suggest that users storing electronic
communications with service providers similarly surrender Fourth
Amendment protection, because they have voluntarily conveyed those
communications to a third party. As I have argued elsewhere, there are
compelling reasons to reject this broad reading. 5 Miller nevertheless pro-
41. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 99-541, at 5, as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3559
(noting that gap in statutory protection "may unnecessarily discourage potential custom-
ers from using innovative communications systems" and "discourage American busi-
nesses from development of new innovative forms of telecommunications and computer
technology"); H.R. REP. No. 99-647, at 19 (noting that absence of legal protection for
"may unnecessarily discourage potential customers from using such systems, and encour-
age unauthorized users to obtain access to communications to which they are not a
party"); see also Electronic Communication Privacy: Hearing on S. 1667 Before the Sub-
comm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 121-22 (1987) (testimony of Philip M. Walker on behalf of e-mail indus-
try noting vulnerability of communications while stored in provider's systems).
42. Indeed, the committee reports on ECPA reflected conflicting views on whether
the Fourth Amendment protected stored communications. Compare S. REP. No. 99-451,
at 3, as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3557 (suggesting that communications in the
hands of a third party "may be subject to no constitutional privacy protection"), with H.R.
REP. No. 99-647, at 22 ("It appears likely.., that the courts would find that the parties to
an e-mail transmission have a 'reasonable expectation of privacy' and that a warrant of
some kind is required.").
43. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
44. Id. at 440.
45. See Bellia, supra note 22, at 1397-1412. The reasoning underlying Miller is
questionable. In particular, Miller conflates two distinct lines of Supreme Court cases. ld.
at 1397-1400. In the first line of cases, the Supreme Court rejected defendants' claims
that the government could not acquire business records turned over to third parties with-
BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20:1283
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vided the foundation for some of ECPA's provisions regulating acquisi-
tion of stored communications, also known as the Stored Communications
Act (SCA).46 Like the Wiretap Act, the SCA prohibits all parties from
47gaining access to certain kinds of communications, but also identifies a
range of circumstances in which law enforcement officials are authorized
to do so. 48 Although the government access provisions require law en-
out a search warrant, finding a subpoena adequate. See, e.g., Couch v. United States, 409
U.S. 322, 335 (1973); Oklahoma Press Pub'g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208 (1946).
In those cases, the Court's reasoning relied not only on the fact that the records were pro-
vided to a third party, but on the nature of the records involved. See, e.g., Couch, 409
U.S. at 335 (rejecting taxpayer's challenge to summons requiring accountant to surrender
taxpayer's records and concluding that "there can be little expectation of privacy where
records are handed to an accountant, knowing that mandatory disclosure of much of the
information therein is required in an income tax return"). In the second line of cases, the
Supreme Court rejected claims that the Fourth Amendment prohibits the government
from introducing into evidence communications revealed, recorded, or transmitted to the
government by a government informant or undercover agent who is a party to the com-
munications. See supra notes 36-37 (citing cases). In those cases, the Court essentially
concluded that one who converses with another assumes the risk that the conversation
will be revealed to law enforcement officials, thus eliminating any possible expectation
of privacy. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971) (plurality opinion)
(noting that the Katz court did not "indicate in any way that defendant has a justifiable
and constitutionally protected expectation that a person with whom he is conversing will
not then or later reveal the conversation to the police").
Miller was a business records case. In relying on the government informant
cases, however, the Miller Court introduced an assumption-of-risk analysis not previ-
ously prominent in the business records cases. See Bellia, supra note 22, at 1402. Even if
Miller's analysis is correct, there are other reasons not to use the Miller framework in
evaluating whether a user has an expectation of privacy in communications the user con-
veys to a service provider. The circumstances in Miller differ significantly from the cir-
cumstances involved when a subscriber relies on a service provider to transmit and store
communications. First, Miller involved negotiable instruments rather than personal com-
munications. Second, in Miller, the defendant's purpose in conveying the records to the
bank-for the bank to complete certain transactions-made the substance of the records
independently relevant to the bank. An e-mail subscriber's purpose in conveying the con-
tents of a communication to a service provider is simply to have the provider transmit the
communication. The contents of the communications are of no relevance to the service
provider. See id. at 1403-05.
46. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 99-541, at 3, as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3557
(discussing Miller); H.R. REP. No. 99-647, at 23 & nn.40-41 (same); Bellia, supra note
22, at 1413 (noting that provisions of the SCA allow for compelled production of the
contents of communications without a search warrant in some circumstances-a result
that is constitutional only if a user lacks an expectation of privacy in at least some com-
munications stored by a provider).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (2000).
48. Id. § 2701(c); 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2000 & Supp. 112002).
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forcement officials to obtain a warrant in some circumstances, 49 in others
they allow law enforcement officials to acquire communications with a
subpoena or a special court order with standards lower than those required
by the Fourth Amendment. 50 Whether a warrant is required turns on inter-
pretation of key statutory terms, such as when communications are held
"in electronic storage" by the provider of an "electronic communication
service., 51 Those same terms also appear' in the SCA's substantive prohi-
bition, 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a), which provides for criminal penalties and
civil damages against one who:
(1) intentionally accesses without authorization a facility through
which an electronic communication service is provided; or
(2) intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that facility;
and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a
wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage
in such system ....
Like the Wiretap Act, the SCA presents a number of difficult interpretive
issues. The first difficulty is how to reconcile the Wiretap Act with the
SCA. As noted, the Wiretap Act does not define interception with enough
specificity to foreclose claims that acquisition of stored communications
constitute an interception. Second, § 2701(a) applies only when a defen-
dant gains access to a "facility through which an electronic communica-
tion service is provided., 52 Although that phrase quite clearly would cover
the mail servers of an e-mail provider, it is not clear what other facilities
the statute covers. Third, with respect to application of the provisions au-
thorizing government access to stored communications, 53 the Justice De-
partment has argued quite forcefully for a narrow construction of "elec-
tronic storage ' '5 4-an interpretation that obviously has significant bearing
on the scope of § 2701 (a), which protects electronic communications only
"while . . in electronic storage. Fourth, because liability under
49. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (Supp. II 2002).
50. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b) (2000).
51. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (Supp. 112002).
52. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (2000).
53. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a), (b) (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
54. See, e.g., COMPUTER CRIME & INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE
IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 88-89 (2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/
cybercrime/s&smanual2002.pdf [hereinafter CCIPS MANUAL].
55. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (2000).
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§ 2701 (a) turns on whether access to the communications facility is unau-
thorized,56 in any given case it will be important to determine the scope of
the defendant's authority. Relatedly, like the Wiretap Act, the SCA has a
consent exception. Section 2701(c)(2) provides that § 2701(a) does not
apply with respect to conduct authorized "by a user of [an electronic
communication service] with respect to a communication of or intended
for that user." 57 Accordingly, a likely point of contention in any particular
case will be whether a "user" has consented to the acquisition of his or her
communications.
C. The Pen/Trap Statute
The final federal statute regulating electronic surveillance activities
prohibits the use of "pen registers" and "trap and trace devices." 58 The
pen/trap provisions formed part of ECPA,59 and, like the SCA, sought to
provide statutory protection following a Supreme Court decision on the
application of the Fourth Amendment to certain government conduct.
In the 1979 case of Smith v. Maryland,6 ° police investigating a robbery
requested that a telephone company install a "pen register"--understood at
the time to mean a device that records the numbers dialed on a telephone
by monitoring electrical impulses triggered when the dial is released-on
the defendant's home telephone line. 1 The information gleaned (specifi-
cally, the fact that the defendant made repeated calls to the robbery victim)
provided-the basis for a search warrant. The defendant sought to suppress
the fruits of that search on the ground that the pen register was installed
without a warrant. 62 Following the reasoning of Katz and Miller, the Court
concluded that the defendant lacked any expectation of privacy in the tele-
phone numbers he dialed: "Telephone users . . . typically know that they
must convey numerical information to the phone company; that the phone
company has facilities for recording this information; and that the phone
company does in fact record this information for a variety of legitimate
business purposes."
63
In light of Smith's conclusion that use of a pen register does not impli-
cate the Fourth Amendment, Congress passed a statute providing minimal
56. Id.
57. Id. § 2701(c)(2).
58. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (2000 & Supp. I 2002).
59. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 301,
100 Stat. 1848, 1868-73.
60. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
61. Id.at736-37&n.1.
62. Id. at 737.
63. Id. at 743.
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statutory protection against the use of pen registers as well as trap and
trace devices (that is, devices designed to capture the origin of an incom-
ing communication). Unlike the Wiretap Act and the SCA, the pen/trap
statute does not create a civil action for violation of its provisions. Instead,
it is a misdemeanor for one to "install or use a pen register or a trap and
trace device without first obtaining a court order" as specified under fed-
eral law.64 Nor does the statute provide for suppression of evidence in vio-
lation of its provisions. As a result, litigation involving the pen/trap statute
is rare. But in the debate over how electronic surveillance law applies to
spyware, there is considerable uncertainty as to where to draw the line be-
tween conduct prohibited by the Wiretap Act and conduct prohibited by
the pen/trap statute.
As noted earlier, the Wiretap Act prohibits the interception of the con-
tents of a communication. 65 The Wiretap Act defines the term "contents"
to include the "substance, purport, or meaning" of a communication.
66 In-
formation falling outside of that category-such as dialing information
associated with a telephone communication or addressing or routing in-
formation associated with an electronic communication-is statutorily
protected,67 if at all, only by the pen/trap statute. With respect to informa-
tion associated with electronic communications, however, the application
of the pen/trap statute has historically been unclear. Although Congress
clarified the reach of the pen/trap statute in the USA Patriot Act,68 it essen-
tially left the determination of where to draw the line between the Wiretap
Act and the pen/trap statute in the hands of the courts.
When the pen/trap statute was first passed in 1986, there was ambigu-
ity as to whether it applied to electronic communications at all. On the one
hand, portions of the statute appeared to focus exclusively on telephone
numbers. For example, the statute required the court order to specify the
number of the "telephone line" to which the pen register or trap and trace
device would be attached 69 as well as the subscriber of that telephone
line. 70 The statute also defined a pen register as a device that "records or
64. 18 U.S.C. § 3121(a) (2000); id. § 3121(d) (setting forth penalty).
65. Id. § 2510(4) (defining "intercept").
66. Id. § 2510(8).
67. Although Smith v. Maryland makes clear that dialing information associated
with a telephone call is not entitled to Fourth Amendment protection, the application of
the Fourth Amendment to information associated with an electronic communication is
more complicated. For further discussion, see Bellia, supra note 22, at 1428-30.
68. See Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 216, 115 Stat. at 283 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3),
(4) (Supp. II 2002)).
69. 18 U.S.C. § 3123(b)(1)(C) (2000).
70. Id. § 3123(b)(l)(A).
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decodes electronic or other impulses which identify the numbers dialed or
otherwise transmitted on the telephone line to which such device is at-
tached.71 On the other hand, the statute defined a trap and trace device as
a device to capture the "originating number" from which "a wire or elec-
tronic communication was transmitted,, 72 thereby suggesting that the stat-
ute covered at least some identifying information associated with elec-
tronic communications. It was thus unclear whether the statute regulated
the use of devices to obtain address information associated with electronic
communications.
In the USA Patriot Act, Congress expanded the "pen register" and
"trap and trace device" definitions, thereby clarifying that the statute cov-
ers devices used to obtain information associated with electronic commu-
nications.73 The definitions apply to devices that gather "dialing, routing,
addressing, or signaling information" indicating the source or destination
of a wire or electronic communication.74 In expanding the definitions,
however, Congress expressly excluded from each definition "the contents
of any communication." The exclusion was designed to allay concerns that
addressing information associated with electronic communications would
in some cases reveal the content of a communication, as where a web
page's uniform resource locator (URL) incorporates search terms. 75 Rather
than responding to these concerns by specifically indicating that URLs
were to be considered "contents," Congress left the matter to judicial in-
terpretation.
With respect to spyware designed to gather URLs and similar data, de-
71. Id. § 3127(3) (emphasis added).
72. Id. § 3127(4) (emphasis added).
73. See Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 216, 115 Stat. at 283 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3),
(4) (Supp. II 2002)).
74. See 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (Supp. II 2002) (defining "pen register" in part as "a
device or process which records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling in-
formation transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic com-
munication is transmitted"); id. § 3127(4) (defining "trap and trace device" in part as "a
device or process which captures the incoming electronic or other impulses which iden-
tify the originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling informa-
tion reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic communication").
75. For example, a search for a book on breast cancer on Barnes & Noble's website
might generate a page displaying search results with the following URL: http://search.
barnesandnoble.com/booksearch/results.asp?WRD=breast+cancer&userid=[redacted].
For privacy advocates' objections to the expansion of the pen/trap statute, see, for exam-
ple, Protecting Constitutional Freedoms in the Face of Terrorism: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Constitution, Federalism, and Property Rights of the S. Judiciary Comm.,
107 Cong. (2001) (testimony of Jerry Berman, Executive Director, Center for Democracy
& Technology), available at http://www.cdt.org/testimony/011003berman.shtml.
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fendants will no doubt argue that such data does not reflect the "contents"
of a communication for purposes of the Wiretap Act. Although I do not
independently discuss application of the pen/trap statute to spyware, I ex-
plore the content/noncontent distinction in the course of discussing appli-
cation of the Wiretap Act.
III. THE CHALLENGES OF APPLYING SURVEILLANCE LAW
TO SPYWARE
Part II sets forth the basic structure of the federal electronic surveil-
lance framework. Application of surveillance statutes to spyware is intui-
tively appealing: the statutes prohibit the interception or unauthorized ac-
quisition of "electronic communications," and some forms of spyware
clearly do capture users' electronic communications. As discussed below,
however, there are good reasons to be skeptical that surveillance law stat-
utes will curb anything but the most extreme forms of spyware.
Controversy surrounds the application of the term "spyware," and
76
many products might fall within or just outside of the spyware category.
In assessing the applicability of surveillance law statutes, I focus on two
products that are often labeled spyware: keystroke monitors and software
designed to track Internet usage and deliver targeted advertising. These
products illustrate a number of problems with applying electronic surveil-
lance law to spyware, although I hope to sidestep the controversy over the
appropriate use of the spyware label with respect to these products. In Sec-
tion A, I briefly discuss the technology at issue. In Sections B and C, I dis-
cuss application of the Wiretap Act and the SCA, respectively.
A. The Technology at Issue
I begin with the application of electronic surveillance statutes to soft-
ware and hardware devices that serve as "keystroke monitors"-that is,
programs and devices that monitor every keystroke typed on a given com-
puter.77 Other devices and programs-such as "screen shot" utilities,
76. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 109-32, at 10 (2005) (report of Committee on Energy
and Commerce, noting that the committee, "received testimony that spyware represents a
range of software programs on a broad continuum from the most pernicious criminal ac-
tivities on one end to the less threatening but still intrusive on the opposite end of the
spectrum"); FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 3 ("Panelists generally agreed that
reaching an industry consensus on one definition [of spyware] has been elusive because
of the technical complexity and dynamic nature of software.").
77. Hardware and software advertised to have such capabilities includes
KeyKatcher, http://www.keykatcher.com (last visited Sept. 1, 2005); Keylogger Pro, see
http://www.exploreanywhere.com/kp-intro.php (last visited Sept. 1, 2005); and iSpyNow,
[Vol. 20:12831298
SPYWARE AND THE LIMITS OF SURVEILLANCE LAW
which store images of what a computer screen displays at particular inter-
vals-will raise similar analytical issues.78 Keystroke monitors represent
one of the most egregious forms of spyware when deployed against an
unwitting user. Keystroke monitors consist of either hardware devices that
attach to a computer at a point between the computer and its central proc-
essing unit (CPU)79 or software programs installed by a person with ad-
ministrative control of a computer or perhaps even remotely, through a
security vulnerability or as part of a bundle of software. Keystroke moni-
tors are used for a range of purposes including lawful ones. An employer
may deploy such a tool to monitor or deter abuse of a company computer
system, or a parent may use it to monitor a child's Internet usage. Such
programs and devices obviously have far more problematic uses as well:
for hackers to acquire passwords, credit card numbers, or financial infor-
mation, for one spouse to monitor another's online behavior, or for one co-
worker to spy on another.
I also consider the application of surveillance law to software installed
on a user's computer to track the user's Internet usage and deliver targeted
advertising. Such software is often referred to as "adware"; precisely
where to draw the line between "adware" and "spyware" is controver-
sial 8 Most commentators focus on the issue of consent: when the user
does not receive appropriate notice of the software's activities or lacks the
ability to decline its installation, such software meets the definition of
spyware 8 2 Of course, what constitutes appropriate notice or adequate con-
sent is itself a difficult issue. For purposes of my analysis, the "adware" or
"spyware" label is less important than an understanding of how the soft-
ware functions.
Recent litigation over software that allegedly tracks users' Internet ac-
see http://www.ispynow.com (last visited Sept. 1, 2005).
78. For a case involving a dispute over a wife's use of a screen shot utility to record
her husband's online activities to find evidence of infidelity, see O'Brien v. O'Brien, 899
So. 2d 1133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
79. KeyKatcher operates in this manner. See http://www.keykatcher.com (last vis-
ited Sept. 1, 2005). For discussion of a case involving use of this device, see infra notes
107-113 and accompanying text.
80. For example, a tool called Perfect Keylogger was advertised as having a "unique
remote installation feature. You can attach keylogger to any other program and send it by
e-mail to install on the remote PC in the stealth mode." See http://www.blazing
tools.comlbpk.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2004) (on file with author).
81. See, e.g., FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 3-4 (noting range of views on
whether and when adware should be classified as spyware).
82. See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV.
L. REv. 2055, 2065 (2004).
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tivities sheds some light on how targeted advertising software functions.
8 3
WhenU.com's "SaveNow" software provides one example. Typically, a
user downloads the SaveNow software as part of a bundle of free soft-
ware. 84 Once loaded onto a user's computer, the SaveNow software
launches whenever the user's browser is active. The software scans data
from a browsing session, including URLs, search terms typed into a search
engine, and the contents of a requested page.8 5 The software compares the
URLs, search terms, or keywords drawn from a web page to terms in its
proprietary database.8 6 A match triggers contextual pop-up advertising.
8 7
Keystroke monitors and software for contextual advertising represent
only two among a wide range of products that might be considered spy-
ware.88 Nevertheless, they illustrate the difficulties of applying electronic
surveillance law to spyware. Because of significant overlap among the is-
sues with respect to each type of product, I discuss the issues by statute
rather than by product.
As I will show, electronic surveillance law constrains only the most
extreme forms of spyware-and even then, there are pitfalls. Although the
Wiretap Act presents an obvious option for controlling devices and soft-
ware with keystroke monitoring capabilities, current case law suggests that
the matter is more complicated. With respect to applications that gather
data and communications so as to provide targeted advertising, the issue of
consent will be an impediment to controlling the distribution of software
that many would regard as deceptive and highly privacy-intrusive. In other
words, surveillance law may be used to target the most serious forms of
spyware, but it is unlikely to otherwise force change in industry practices
concerning the distribution and functionality of software.
83. See, e.g., 1-800 CONTACTS, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 414 F.3d 400, 2005 U.S.
App. LEXIS 12711, at *1 (2d Cir. Jun. 27, 2005); Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com,
Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734 (E.D. Mich. 2003); U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279
F. Supp. 2d 723 (E.D. Va. 2003).
84. See 1-800 CONTACTS, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 12711, at *9; Wells Fargo, 293
F. Supp. 2d at 743; U-Haul, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 725.
85. See 1-800 CONTACTS, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 12711, at *10; Wells Fargo, 293
F. Supp. 2d at 743-44; U-Haul, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 725.
86. See 1-800 CONTACTS, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 12711, at *10; Wells Fargo, 293
F. Supp. 2d at 743; U-Haul, 279 F. Supp. 2d 725-26.
87. See 1-800 CONTACTS, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 12711, at *10-*1 1; Wells Fargo,
293 F. Supp. 2d at 743; U-Haul, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 726.
88. For further discussion of products that might be considered "spyware," see H.R.
REP. 109-32, at 10-11 (2005); FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 2-8.
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B. The Wiretap Act
1. The "Interception " Problem
As discussed earlier, § 2511(1)(a) of the Wiretap Act prohibits any
person from "intentionally intercept[ing] . ..a wire, oral, or electronic
communication." 89 The term "intercept" is defined as "the aural or other
acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication
through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device." 90 The first
question in applying the Wiretap Act to spyware, then, is whether the use
of a particular spyware product in fact results in the "intercept[ion]" of the
"contents" of an "electronic communication."
I alluded earlier to one difficulty with the term interception: determin-
ing whether a communication must be captured in transmission to qualify
or whether the Wiretap Act also covers acquisition of communications
from storage (as when an e-mail is held for retrieval by the recipient). 91
Most courts have agreed that interception occurs when electronic commu-
nications are acquired during transmission and not when they are acquired
from storage.92 But even with spyware used on an ongoing basis to moni-
tor data as it is being transmitted, interpretive issues may still impede ap-
plication of the Wiretap Act.
Keystroke monitors present particular difficulties. In many cases, a
keystroke monitor will capture data solely within a single computer sys-
tem-perhaps, as noted, between the keyboard and the CPU. The issue is
whether acquisition of data within a single system can constitute an inter-
ception of an electronic communication.
Two courts considering that question have concluded that interception
of a communication cannot occur within a single system. In United States
v. Scarfo,93 federal investigators, after obtaining a warrant, attached a key-
stroke monitor to the computer of a defendant suspected of running an il-
legal gambling and loan-sharking operation.94 The investigators sought to
obtain the password for the defendant's encryption software. They suc-
cessfully obtained that F assword, which allowed decryption of other pre-
viously obtained files. 9 The defendant later moved to suppress evidence
89. 18 U.S.C. §2511(1)(a) (2000).
90. Id. § 2510(4). The statute does not define the term "device."
91. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text; infra notes 194-229, 281-293 and
accompanying text.
92. See supra note 34 (citing cases).
93. 180 F. Supp. 2d 572 (D.N.J. 2001).
94. Id. at 574.
95. Id.
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derived from the use of the keystroke monitor on the theory that the gov-
ernment should have obtained a full Title III order before installing the
device. 96 The issue was whether the government's use of the device re-
sulted in the interception of communications without a Title III order.
97
The government argued that the keystroke monitor did not "intercept"
communications within the meaning of the Wiretap Act. In particular, the
government configured the device to determine whether the modem on the
defendant's computer was operating at any point in time; if the modem
was operating, the keystroke monitor would not collect data.98 In other
words, the device would not capture a keystroke unless all of the com-
puter's communication ports were inactive. 99 The district court concluded
that in this context, no Title III order was necessary: the keystroke monitor
acquired only data "within" the defendant's computer.
100
The court's opinion was somewhat opaque in two respects. First, it al-
ternately referred to the communications the government was alleged to
have intercepted as "wire communications"' 01 and "electronic communi-
cations. ' 0 2 Because the communications did not contain the human voice,
they could not have been "wire" communications.1 0 3 The distinction be-
tween electronic and wire communications in fact should have been cru-
cial to the case. The Wiretap Act provides no suppression remedy for ac-
quisition of an electronic communication in violation of its terms; 1°4 a mo-
tion to suppress electronic communications could have been based only on
the Fourth Amendment. In Scarfo, however, the defendant sought suppres-
sion only under the Wiretap Act. 0 5 Second, the court never clearly ex-
plained why the modem's inactivity precluded the court from treating the
96. Id.
97. Id. at 575.
98. Id. at 581-82.
99. Id. at 582.
100. Id. at 582 n.5.
101. See id. at 576, 582.
102. See id. at 581-82.
103. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (2000) (defining wire communication as an "aural
transfer"); id. § 2510(18) (defining aural transfer as "a transfer containing the human
voice").
104. See id. § 2515 (barring introduction of contents of intercepted wire or oral com-
munications into evidence); id. § 2518(10)(a) (permitting motion to suppress contents of
wire or oral communication); id. § 2518(10)(c) (deeming remedies described with respect
to electronic communications "the only judicial remedies and sanctions for nonconstitu-
tional violations of this chapter"). Confusion over Title III's suppression provisions is not
uncommon. See Bellia, supra note 22, at 1392-93 n. 106.
105. 180 F. Supp. 2d at 576 (noting defendant's claim that government intercepted a
communication "in violation of Title III").
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acquisition of the communications as an interception. It is possible to con-
struct one rationale, although the district court did not articulate it. By
definition, an "electronic communication" must be transmitted by a system
"that affects interstate or foreign commerce." 10 6 It could be argued that
communications purely internal to a computer are not transmitted by a
system affecting interstate commerce and therefore are not "electronic
communications."
In United States v. Ropp,10 7 the district court essentially adopted this
rationale. Ropp involved a government prosecution under the Wiretap Act
of a defendant who installed a keystroke monitor on a co-worker's com-
puter.10 8 The defendant physically attached a "KeyKatcher" device to the
co-worker's computer where the keyboard attached to the computer's
CPU.'0 9 The device picked up every keystroke as it was transmitted from
the keyboard to the CPU.
In analyzing the legality of the defendant's behavior under the Wiretap
Act, the district court focused on whether an "electronic communication"
was involved. Recall the government's position in Scarfo: the Wiretap Act
is not implicated where data is retrieved from within a computer system
without an active communications port. In Ropp, the government took a
slightly different position: the Wiretap Act applies to the acquisition of
"any signal transmitted from a keyboard to a computer with an internet
connection," "whether or not the internet connection was activated at the
time of the transmission."' 10 In other words, the government's position in
Scarfo at least implicitly suggested that a communication that merely ex-
ists within a single computer does not constitute an "electronic communi-
cation," even if the computer can connect to the Internet. In Ropp, the
government argued that a communication within a single computer with
an available Internet connection does constitute an "electronic communi-
cation," because "the system by virtue of that connection 'affects interstate
commerce. ,,,1
The Ropp court rejected the government's new approach and, relying
on Scarfo, concluded that the Wiretap Act's definition of electronic com-
munications applies only to data that is in fact being transmitted beyond a
local computer by a system that affects interstate or foreign commerce.12
106. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2000).
107. 347 F. Supp. 2d 831 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 835 (emphasis added).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 836, 837-38.
130320051
BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
Even though the defendant's device captured keystrokes used in the com-
position of e-mail, the court concluded that no interception of an electronic
communication occurred. Although the computer system from which the
communications were acquired "is connected to a larger system-the net-
work-which affects interstate or foreign commerce, the transmission at
issue did not involve that system.""
3
In short, Scarfo and Ropp essentially hold that if a device or program
is capturing communications at a point where the communications are in-
ternal to the user's system, then no interception occurs. Under this analy-
sis, the Wiretap Act fails to regulate some of the most problematic forms
of spyware, including keystroke monitors. Depending on how a particular
piece of software operates, the Act may also fail to regulate software de-
signed to facilitate contextual advertising, regardless of how much data the
software acquires. Because such software is proprietary, it is often difficult
to determine precisely how the software works. In particular, it is unclear
whether such software captures data at a point within the user's computer
or as communications are transmitted to the Internet. Under case law such
as Scarfo and Ropp, these seemingly trivial issues become critical.
Of course, the extent to which Scarfo and Ropp will constrain distribu-
tion and use of keystroke monitors depends partly upon the extent to
which they remain good law. The Wiretap Act ruling in Scarfo was appar-
ently not appealed; the government sought reconsideration of the Ropp
decision at the district court level, and its motion remains unresolved.'
14
113. Id. at 838.
114. The Ropp court buttressed its conclusion with one decision that is no longer
good law, United States v. Councilman, 373 F.3d 197 (1st Cir. 2004), reh'g en banc
granted and opinion withdrawn, 385 F.3d 793 (2004), on reh'g en banc, No. 03-1383,
2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 16803 (1st Cir. Aug. 11, 2005). See Ropp, 347 F. Supp. 2d at
836-38. In the Councilman case, the government sought to prosecute under the Wiretap
Act an Internet service provider that captured the communications of its customers before
transmitting them into to the customers' mailboxes. The district court and a panel of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the communications were acquired
during a brief period of storage within the provider's system and therefore were not inter-
cepted for purposes of the Wiretap Act. Councilman, 373 F.3d at 199. Relying on Coun-
cilman, the Ropp court reasoned that if messages momentarily stored within a provider's
system are not intercepted for purposes of the Wiretap Act, then signals internal to a
computer prior to transmission certainly cannot be. Ropp, 347 F. Supp. 2d at 838.
The reasoning in Councilman was weak. Several courts construing the Wiretap
Act had previously held that the statute does not protect stored communications. See su-
pra note 34 (citing cases). Those cases differed from Councilman in an important respect,
however: they involved a one-time acquisition of communications maintained by a ser-
vice provider for retrieval by the subscriber, whereas Councilman involved an ongoing
acquisition of communications briefly stored during the transmission process prior to
[Vol. 20:12831304
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With respect to both cases, it is tempting for commentators to argue that
the cases involved erroneous reasoning or could be easily overturned with
a statutory fix." 5 It is nevertheless important to recognize one outer limit
on any judicial or legislative response. Most of the Wiretap Act was en-
acted under Congress's power under the Commerce Clause;" 6 that was
undoubtedly one reason for linking the definition of an electronic commu-
nication to a transmission involving a system "that affects interstate or
foreign commerce."' 17 It is difficult to see how, under current Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, Congress could attempt to constrain use of a key-
stroke monitor on a standalone computer. The question then becomes
whether the fact that a computer is networked, without more, necessarily
sweeps it within Congress's reach.
2. The "Consent" Problem
If courts move past the "interception" problem, the Wiretap Act may
become a tool for controlling spyware that is surreptitiously installed. For
other forms of spyware, however, the problem of "consent" may become a
being made available to the subscriber. On rehearing en banc, the First Circuit rejected
the district court and panel decisions, holding that the Wiretap Act prohibits the acquisi-
tion of electronic communications during transmission, even if those communications are
briefly stored during the transmission process. Councilman, 2005 WL 1907258, at * 10.
Although the Ropp court did discuss the panel opinion in Councilman, the rever-
sal of the Councilman decision has little bearing on the central issue in Ropp: whether
communications wholly within a single computer system constitute "electronic commu-
nications."
115. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1265, 1282 (describing Scarfo as involving "an end run around [the Wire-
tap Act] based on a technicality").
116. See S. REP. No. 90-1097 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2180.
As the report of the Senate Judiciary Committee accompanying the Wiretap Act sug-
gested, "the facilities used to transmit wire communications form part of the interstate or
foreign communications network." Id. For oral communications, the congressional power
issues were more complicated. Such communications are far less likely to affect interstate
commerce. To the extent that the provisions regulate acquisition of oral communications
by state officials, the statute can be viewed as "enforcement" of the Fourth Amendment,
as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, because the statute defines oral commu-
nications as communications uttered by a person exhibiting a justifiable expectation that
such communication is not subject to interception. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (2000). For
provisions regulating acquisition of oral communications by private parties, the constitu-
tional hook is less clear. The Judiciary Committee report contains an unusually candid
discussion of the potential constitutional problems with application of the statute to pri-
vate conduct. See S. REP. No. 90-1097, as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2180.
117. See H.R. REP. No. 99-647, at 35 (1986) (noting that the definition was "intended
to cover a broad range of communication activities that affect interstate or foreign com-
merce").
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major impediment to the application of the statute. As noted earlier, the
Wiretap Act contains consent exceptions both for conduct under color of
law" 8 and purely private conduct. 119 For purely private conduct,
§ 2511 (2)(d) of the Wiretap Act provides:
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting
under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic com-
munication where such person is a party to the communication or
where. one of the parties to the communication has given prior
consent to such interception unless such communication is inter-
cepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of
any State.
What constitutes "prior consent" for purposes of the Wiretap Act? As
noted earlier, employers may lawfully deploy keystroke monitors or simi-
lar devices to monitor employees' use of a company computer system.
Generally, employers avoid liability under the Wiretap Act by providing
notice of their monitoring activities-by displaying computer screen
"banners" to inform employees that use of a company computer system
constitutes consent to monitoring or by providing an "acceptable use" pol-
icy (perhaps signed by the employee) stating that monitoring may occur.
But consent issues may arise even when a user is not directly confronted
with a warning banner or fails to sign an acceptable use policy.
Assume, for example, that a user downloads a "bundle" of software
products, and one piece of software within that bundle collects a user's
data or communications. Those monitoring capabilities may be identified
in an accompanying license agreement requiring the user to click "I
Agree" before downloading the products. Does clicking "I Agree" consti-
tute "consent" to satisfy § 2511(2)(d) of the Wiretap Act? This question
will arise more commonly with software that monitors a user's communi-
cations so as to generate targeted advertising than with keystroke moni-
tors. But in either scenario, no clear answer exists. On the one hand, courts
applying related doctrines (including different provisions of the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) 120 and common law analogues) have
broadly construed license agreements in favor of licensors-even when it
118. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (2000).
119. Id. § 2511(2)(d).
120. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000 & Supp. II 2002). Technically, the title Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act refers to the 1986 amendments to 18 U.S.C. § 1030, see Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-474, § 1, 100 Stat. 1213, but courts commonly
use it to describe 18 U.S.C. § 1030 as a whole.
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is questionable whether the licensee has manifested assent to particular
notices provided by the licensor. 12 1 On the other hand, commentators (my-
self included) have criticized this trend.1 22 For plaintiffs seeking to argue
that the gathering of data or communications constitutes a violation of the
Wiretap Act, the First Circuit's decision in In re Pharmatrak Privacy Liti-
gation provides perhaps the most support.
123
121. These issues arise in a variety of doctrinal contexts, including contract claims,
application of the CFAA, and application of common law trespass to chattels doctrine.
For contract claims, cases involving "shrinkwrap" licenses, where the consumer's act of
breaking the shrinkwrap is deemed to be assent to the governing terms, form the founda-
tion for courts' analysis. The trend among courts is to enforce such licenses, so long as
the consumer has a right to reject the terms by returning the product. See, e.g., ProCD v.
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452-53 (7th Cir. 1996); Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d
1147, 1149-50 (7th Cir. 1997). Extending this reasoning to the online context, courts
have enforced "clickwrap" or "click-through" licenses that require a user to click "I
Agree" or "I Accept" before downloading a particular product, at least where the "offer"
makes clear that clicking the button will signify assent to the terms. Compare i.Lan Sys.,
Inc. v. NetScout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 338 (D. Mass. 2002) (enforcing
license where terms appeared on screen prior to software installation and defendant
checked "I Agree" box), Forrest v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 805 A.2d 1007, 1010-11
(D.C. 2002) (enforcing forum selection clause where terms were displayed in scroll box
and plaintiff subscriber clicked "Accept" button), Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C.,
732 A.2d 528, 530-31 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (enforcing forum selection clause
contained in agreement with ISP, where prospective subscriber could only access service
by clicking "I Agree"), Moore v. Microsoft Corp., 741 N.Y.S.2d 91, 92 (App. Div. 2002)
(dismissing claim against software manufacturer where plaintiff user clicked on "I agree"
icon before downloading software and claim was barred by license agreement), and Bar-
nett v. Network Solutions, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 200, 204 (Tex. App. 2001) (finding forum
selection clause enforceable where plaintiff had to scroll through terms and accept them
before proceeding), with Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 31-32 (2d
Cir. 2002) (finding license terms unenforceable where terms appeared only on portion of
webpage below software download button). For CFAA claims enforcing "terms of use"
with minimal discussion of issues of notice and assent, see Am. Online v. Nat'l Health
Care Disc., Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1276 (N.D. Iowa 2000); Am. Online v. LCGM,
Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444, 448 (E.D. Va. 1998); cf EF Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp.,
318 F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir. 2003) (suggesting that terms of use appearing on website would
define the boundaries of use for purposes of CFAA). For similar approaches in trespass to
chattels cases, see LCGM, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 448; Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie Inc.,
47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1020, 1025 (N.D. Cal. 1998). I discuss the nuances of these and
similar cases in Patricia L. Bellia, Defending Cyberproperty, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 2164,
2225-45 (2004).
122. See Bellia, supra note 121, at 2245-52. Much of commentators' concern is
driven by intellectual property law, in that broad enforcement of license agreements will
allow content providers to appropriate control over content that copyright law would not
permit. For discussion of such arguments, see id. at 2193-2201. There are, however, im-
portant fair notice concerns as well. See id. at 2192-93.
123. 329 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2003) [hereinafter PharmatrakII], on remand, 292 F. Supp.
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Pharmatrak constitutes one in a series of cases in which plaintiffs
claimed that the placement of "cookies" on their hard drives violated the
Wiretap Act, the SCA, and provisions of the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act.' 24 With respect to the Wiretap Act, plaintiffs argued that, through
placing cookies on their hard drives, companies intercepted their personal
communications.125 Most of the cases involved third-party advertisers who
had arrangements with various sites to serve advertisements to website
users. 126 Source code on the affiliated website triggered the user's browser
to contact the third-party advertiser's server to provide the appropriate ad;
this contact between the user and the third-party advertiser enabled the
advertiser to place a cookie on the user's hard drive.' 27 The third-party ad-
vertiser could associate various information in its database with that
cookie (or update the cookie itself to reflect that information), including
which of the advertiser's affiliated sites the user viewed and for how
long.128 Because third-party advertisers may be affiliated with a significant
number of such sites, their use of cookies can result in substantial gather-
ing of data. Once a third-party advertiser causes a cookie to be written to
the user's hard drive, it can associate with that cookie (or update that
cookie to reflect) not only information about the sites the user browsed
that first caused the cookie to be set, but also information about sites the
user subsequently browsed that were affiliated with the same advertiser. 1
29
Allegations that the gathered communications included personal in-
formation stemmed from the manner in which browsers and web servers
interact. When contacting a web server, browsers convey several pieces of
information to facilitate the server's response, including the browser type
and the language in which the browser is operating. Browsers may also
convey the contents of the so-called "Referer" variable-a variable the
user's browser typically sets to contain the URL of the previously ac-
2d 263 (D. Mass. 2003).
124. See In re Toys R Us, Inc. Privacy Litig., 2001 WL 34517252 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9,
2001); Chance v. Avenue A, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153 (W.D. Wash. 2001); In re Intuit
Privacy Litig., 138 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (C.D. Cal. 2001); In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy
Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
125. See, e.g., Toys R Us, 2001 WL 34517252, at *1, *6-*8; Chance, 165 F. Supp. 2d
at 1155; Intuit, 138 F. Supp. 2d at 1274; DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 500.
126. Pharmatrak involved a third party, but not an advertiser. See In re Pharmatrak
Privacy Litig., 220 F. Supp. 2d 4, 7 (D. Mass. 2002) [hereinafter Pharmatrak I]. Of the
remaining cases cited, the only one not involving a third-party advertiser was Intuit. 138
F. Supp. 2d at 1274.
127. See, e.g., Chance, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1156; DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 503.
128. SeePharmatraklI,329F.3dat 14.
129. See DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 503-04 & n.12.
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cessed web page.' 30 The use of certain web forms can result in the incor-
poration of personal information into a URL. 13 1 Accordingly, routine in-
teraction of a browser with a third-party advertiser's server could lead to
the advertiser's acquisition of personal information.
I discuss in Part IV some of the significant problems with claims that
use of cookies violates the surveillance law statutes. 32 Here, I focus on
one aspect of the cases: their discussion of the Wiretap Act's consent ex-
ception. In most of the cookie cases, courts concluded that no Wiretap Act
claim was available, because the companies had effectively consented to
the third-party advertiser's acquisition of any communications between the
users and the companies' servers.' 33 Courts so held even though it was un-
clear whether the companies knew precisely what information the third-
party advertiser could gather. The sole case to break with this trend was
Pharmatrak.
Pharmatrak had entered into agreements with several pharmaceutical
companies to aggregate certain data concerning the companies' users.'
34
Like a third-party advertiser, Pharmatrak arranged with the pharmaceutical
companies to require them to place on their websites certain source code
causing a customer's browser to communicate with Pharmatrak's serv-
ers.1 35 Communications between the customer and the pharmaceutical
websites occasionally involved an exchange of personally identifiable in-
formation. 136 In certain cases, because a customer's communication with a
pharmaceutical website immediately preceded its communication with
Pharmatrak's servers, Pharmatrak's servers captured this personally identi-
130. "Referer" is a misspelling of referrer. See R. Fielding et al., Hypertext Transfer
Protocol-HTTP/1.1 Request for Comments 2616, § 14.36, at 86 (1999), http://www.
faqs.org/ftp/rfc/rfc2616.pdf.
131. See, e.g., PharnatrakII, 329 F.3d at 16; DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 504.
132. See infra notes 230-253 and accompanying text.
133. See, e.g., Chance, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1162; DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 514.
In Toys R Us, the district court recognized that Toys R Us had consented to the third-
party's acquisition of communications. 2001 WL 34517252, at *7-*8. The court declined
to dismiss the Wiretap Act claim, however, because it believed that the plaintiffs had
sufficiently alleged that any interception, though consensual, was undertaken with a tor-
tious purpose. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 251 1(2)(d) (2000) (excluding from private-party con-
sent exception communications intercepted "for the purpose of committing any criminal
or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any
State"). Similar claims were raised but rejected in other cases. See Chance, 165 F. Supp.
2d at 1163; DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 519.
134. PharmatrakI1, 329 F.3d at 12.
135. PharmatrakI, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 7.
136. Pharmatrak I, 329 F.3d at 15-16.
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fiable information.'
37
When a group of plaintiffs brought suit alleging that Pharmatrak's
conduct violated the Wiretap Act, Pharmatrak responded by asserting that
the pharmaceutical defendants were parties to the allegedly intercepted
communications and consented to the use of Pharmatrak's 
system.' 38
Other courts had accepted this line of argument in cases involving third-
party advertisers,' 39 and the district court granted Pharmatrak summary
judgment on the claim.' 40 Here, however, the First Circuit rejected the
consent argument. Although the pharmaceutical companies had in general
terms consented to the use of Pharmatrak's proposed system for gathering
data on customers, Pharmatrak never made clear that the system would
gather personally identifiable information. 14 1 The companies' general con-
sent to the use of the system was not sufficient to trigger the Wiretap Act's
consent exception.
The First Circuit's approach in Pharmatrak suggests that the consent
exception to the Wiretap Act's prohibition will be triggered only when the
consenting party knows with a high degree of specificity what information
will be acquired. Pharmatrak remains the exception rather than the rule,
however; in none of the other cookie cases did courts examining the con-
sent issue require that degree of specificity. Accordingly, the Wiretap
Act's consent exception is likely to remain an impediment to applying the
statute to software installed after a user is presented with a license agree-
ment. 142 Of course, purveyors of spyware will sometimes use more decep-
tive tactics, such as installing software remotely through a security vulner-
ability, or allowing installation of software to proceed even when a user
attempts to decline or cancel installation. The Wiretap Act may be more
effective in these situations. It is important to note, however, that once
software or a device with the capability to collect data or communications
is installed or deployed, the method by which it was installed has little
bearing on the degree to which the software or device affects the user's
privacy interests. In other words, the Wiretap Act calibrates its coverage
137. Id. at 16.
138. Id. at 19.
139. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
140. PharmatrakI, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 12.
141. Pharmatrak II, 329 F.3d at 20.
142. As noted above, see supra note 133, plaintiffs have largely been unsuccessful in
arguing that an interception, though consensual, is committed with a tortious or criminal
purpose. According to the Chance and DoubleClick courts, it is not enough that the de-
fendant has committed a tort; rather, the primary motivation or determining factor in its
actions must have been to injure the plaintiff tortiously. See Chance, 165 F. Supp. 2d at
1163; DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 518.
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based on whether the user in some sense consented to the software or de-
vice's installation, not the degree to which the software or device other-
wise affects the user's privacy interests. I return to this point in Part IV.
3. The "Content" Problem
A final issue that arises in applying the Wiretap Act to various forms
of spyware concerns whether the data seized, even if it is collected as it is
transmitted from the user's computer to the Internet, is properly thought of
as the "contents" of a communication. The Wiretap Act prohibits only the
acquisition of the contents of a communication.1 43 When Congress
amended the pen/trap statute in the USA Patriot Act to allow acquisition
of data associated with electronic communications, it specified that the
pen/trap statute cannot be used to acquire the contents of a communica-
tion. In doing so, however, Congress created ambiguity as to precisely
where the line between the contents of communications and addressing or
routing information associated with a communication is to be drawn. 144
The Wiretap Act defines the "contents" of a communication to include
information concerning the "substance, purport, or meaning" of the com-
munication. 45 No court has yet considered the status under the Wiretap
Act or the pen/trap statute of URLs, which clearly identify addressing or
routing information concerning the source of a communication and thus
would fall within the pen register and trap and trace definitions if not for
the exclusion of contents. If a Wiretap Act claim were brought in a case
involving acquisition of URLs and search terms through use of a key-
stroke monitor or software for contextual advertising, there is little doubt
that a defendant would argue that the communications in question did not
reflect content.
Nevertheless, powerful arguments can be made that much of what a
keystroke monitor or software designed to facilitate contextual advertising
would capture constitutes the contents of a communication. There are cer-
tainly examples of URLs that convey the meaning of a communication. As
noted earlier, by virtue of the operation of certain web forms, URLs can
sometimes incorporate search terms or other information that a user
wishes to remain private. For example, a search of an online bookstore for
books on "breast cancer" may generate a page of search results identified
by a URL that contains those search terms. 14 6 Even some URLs, without
more, supply information on what the rest of a web page contains, and
143. See supra notes 33, 65 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 65-75 and accompanying text.
145. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (2000).
146. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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thus give information on the "substance, purport, or meaning" of a com-
munication. 1
4 7
Although there are powerful arguments that at least some URLs con-
vey "contents" of a communication, an important impediment to courts'
proper resolution of that issue still exists. As with many other statutory
distinctions in electronic surveillance law, there are constitutional under-
pinnings to the distinctions the Wiretap Act and the pen/trap statute draw
between content and non-content information. 148 In a dispute involving the
government, a court would carefully apply the canon of constitutional
avoidance' 49 so as to construe the term "contents" fairly broadly, possibly
concluding that URLs contain content. A court facing claims involving
only private parties is far less likely to be sensitive to this constitutional
backdrop.' 50 I return to this issue in Part IV.
4. Summary
As this discussion suggests, there is good reason to be skeptical that
the Wiretap Act will successfully curb anything but the most extreme
forms of spyware. With respect to keystroke monitors, the fact that such
programs or devices can capture communications before they are transmit-
ted over the Internet suggests that, at least under existing case law, no in-
terception occurs. For programs that capture communications as they are
being transmitted over the Internet, the issue of consent will be extremely
important, particularly if the programs were accompanied by a license
agreement explaining their capabilities. Finally, the fact that the Wiretap
Act covers only interception of the contents of a communication opens
avenues for defendants to argue that certain data does not qualify as con-
tents, and in the context of cases involving private parties, courts may be
insensitive to the constitutional boundaries between content and non-
content information.
147. Of course, one could argue that a URL and the accompanying web page are dis-
tinct electronic communications. The statute appears to treat as "contents" only informa-
tion concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of the communication in question-
for example, the URL-not information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of
other communications-for example, the web page.
148. For further discussion, see Bellia, supra note 22, at 1428-30.
149. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 239 (1999).
150. 1 discuss below the ways in which surveillance law's coverage of both govern-
ment and private conduct can act as a double-edged sword. See infra notes 188-189, 294-
298 and accompanying text.
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C. The Stored Communications Act
The previous section explored the application of the Wiretap Act's
prohibition on interception of electronic communications to various forms
of spyware. Despite the intuitive characterization of spyware as a tool for
intercepting communications, several interpretive issues complicate the
analysis. The fit between spyware and the SCA is far less intuitive, but the
statute is still likely to be invoked in efforts to curb spyware. Parties ob-
jecting to privacy-invasive practices with respect to electronic communi-
cations frequently tack SCA claims onto Wiretap Act claims.
Despite the frequency with which the SCA is invoked in privacy dis-
putes, the statute protects an extremely narrow category of communica-
tions. As a result, it is unlikely to be of real benefit to plaintiffs objecting
to most forms of spyware. To be sure, existing case law seems to leave
open broader interpretations of the SCA. I return to that case law in Part
IV to illustrate its flaws. For now, I focus on the SCA's text and legislative
history.
1. The "Facility" Problem
Recall that the SCA prohibits one from gaining unauthorized access to
a "facility through which an electronic communication service is pro-
vided," and thereby "obtain[ing], alter[ing], or prevent[ing] authorized ac-
cess to a wire or electronic communication while it is in storage in such
system."' 5 1 A threshold requirement for any SCA claim, then, is a demon-
stration that a defendant gained unauthorized access to a "facility" through
which an electronic communication service is provided.
Drawing upon the SCA's language and ECPA's legislative history, it
is possible to identify some obvious examples of unauthorized access to a
facility of an electronic communication service. The mail server of a ser-
vice provider such as America Online would certainly qualify: the e-mail
service is the "electronic communication service," insofar as it provides
"users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communica-
tions, ' 152 and AOL's mail server is the "facility" through which that ser-
vice is provided. Were someone to hack into AOL's mail servers and ob-
tain communications stored on AOL's servers and awaiting retrieval by a
subscriber, the SCA would certainly cover the conduct. A similar example
with respect to wire communications would be the system of a voicemail
provider. Were someone to gain unauthorized access to the voicemail sys-
tem and then obtain a wire communication, the predicate for § 2701(a)
151. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (2000).
152. Id. § 2510(15).
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would be met.
These examples are quite consistent with ECPA's legislative history.
As the ECPA hearings indicate, much of the impetus for § 2701(a) of the
SCA was that industry representatives feared that users would be deterred
from using new communications systems if communications stored within
those systems were unprotected.153 Section 2701(a) was not designed as a
general hacking statute; in fact, Congress was careful to limit the overlap
between ECPA and computer crime amendments under consideration in
1986.114 It did so by limiting the SCA's reach to communications within
the facility of a provider of an electronic communication service.
Once we move beyond the servers of e-mail and voicemail providers,
§ 2701(a) becomes more difficult to apply. Cases presenting challenges to
third-party advertisers' use of cookies provide a ready example. The SCA
claims in those cases appeared to be premised on the view that the "facil-
ity" to which the third-party had gained access was the user's hard drive,
by implanting the cookie. I discuss the problems with that approach in Part
IV; for now, it is sufficient to recognize that a similar claim would have to
be made with respect to spyware. The software that acquires a user's data
or communications would be located on the user's hard drive; if § 2701(a)
covers the installation of that software, it can only be because the facility
to which the defendant gained unauthorized access is the plaintiffs com-
puter. Section 2701(a) is thus unlikely to apply at all unless the facility
requirement is broadly interpreted to cover an end-user's computer.
2. The "Authorization" and "Consent" Problems
Even if an end-user's computer is appropriately viewed as a "facility
through which an electronic communication service is provided," other
impediments to application of the SCA exist. To trigger the statute, a de-
fendant's access to a protected facility must be unauthorized, whether "ac-
cess without authorization" or "exceeding authorized access." '155 In addi-
tion, the SCA exempts from its prohibition conduct undertaken with the
consent of a "user [of an electronic communication service] with respect
153. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
154. The overlap between computer crime statutes and ECPA was the subject of
much discussion throughout the ECPA hearings. See, e.g., Electronic Communication
Privacy: Hearing on S. 1667 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trade-
marks, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 94-95 (1987); Electronic Com-
munications Privacy Act: Hearings on H.R. 3378 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Administration of Justice, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. 22-23 (1986).
155. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (2000).
[Vol. 20:1283
SPYWARE AND THE LIMITS OF SURVEILLANCE LAW
to a communication of or intended for that user."
'1 56
Here, the issues are similar to those discussed above with respect to
the Wiretap Act. The terms "access without authorization," "exceed[ing]
authorized access," and "consent" are undefined. In the cookie cases,
courts disposed of SCA claims in much the same way as Wiretap Act
claims: by concluding that the websites affiliated with the third-party ad-
vertisers were parties to the communications and consented to their acqui-
sition.157 For software products installed following presentation of a li-
cense agreement, a defendant is quite likely to claim that the agreement
adequately revealed that the software would, in the ordinary course of its
operations, obtain a user's Internet communications. As in the case of
Wiretap Act claims, such a defense may well be successful.1
58
3. The "'Electronic Storage" Problem
One final issue is worth mentioning. The SCA requires a showing that
a defendant obtained, altered, or prevented authorized access to a commu-
nication "while . in electronic storage" in a facility through which an
electronic communication service is provided. This portion of the SCA
obviously raises questions similar to the "facility" issue discussed above,
since it seems unlikely that communications stored on a user's hard drive
are properly viewed as stored in a facility through which an electronic
communication service is provided. Even if the term "facility" were con-
strued to cover an end-user's computer, it is not clear what communica-
tions on that computer would meet the technical definition of "electronic
storage."
The SCA incorporates the definition of "electronic storage" that ap-
pears in the Wiretap Act.' 59 Under the Wiretap Act, electronic storage in-
cludes "any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic com-
munication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof' and "any
storage of such communication by an electronic communication service
for purposes of backup protection of such communication."'  With re-
spect to the SCA's provisions governing law enforcement access to stored
communications, where the term "electronic storage" also appears,161 the
Department of Justice has argued for a narrow interpretation: to encom-
156. Id. § 2701(c)(2).
157. See infra note 245 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 120-142 and accompanying text.
159. 18 U.S.C. § 2711(1) (2000).
160. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) (2000 & Supp. 112002).
161. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (Supp. 112002).
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pass only communications not yet retrieved by a subscriber.162 The Justice
Department bases its approach both on the definition of "electronic stor-
age" and on the overall structure of the SCA. In terms of the definition, as
long as a user has not yet retrieved a communication, a service provider's
storage of it is "temporary," "intermediate," and "incidental" to its trans-
mission. Once the user retrieves the communication, any further storage
by the service provider (as, for example, when the user does not delete the
communication) ceases to be "temporary" or "intermediate." Nor is such a
communication stored by the provider for purposes of backup protec-
tion. 16 3 In terms of the structure of the SCA, the Justice Department has
essentially argued that the statute's distinct treatment of providers of elec-
tronic communication services and providers of remote computing ser-
vices can only be understood if electronic storage is narrowly construed. 164
In particular, once a subscriber retrieves a communication and chooses to
retain it on the provider's system, the communication is no longer held in
electronic storage by the provider of an electronic communication service;
instead, it becomes one "held or maintained" by the provider of a remote
computing service "for the purpose of providing storage ... services" to
the subscriber.
165
I have extensively discussed this interpretation-and its limitations
and implications for the SCA's government access provisions-
elsewhere. 166 Here, it is sufficient to note that a fairly narrow interpreta-
tion of "electronic storage" has prevailed in various contexts.' 
67
4. Summary
In sum, the SCA raises a number of difficult interpretive issues that
will likely limit its application to spyware. Because keystroke monitors
involve ongoing acquisition of data, they are unlikely to implicate the
162. See, e.g., CCIPS MANUAL, supra note 54, at 88-89.
163. On this point, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has concluded other-
wise. See Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1076-77 (9th Cir. 2004). I discuss that
case below. See infra notes 254-274 and accompanying text.
164. See CCIPS MANUAL, supra note 54, at 84-89.
165. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(2) (2000 & Supp. 112002).
166. See Bellia, supra note 22, at 1416-26.
167. See, e.g., In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 512
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (electronic storage occurs only "when an electronic communication -ser-
vice temporarily stores a communication while waiting to deliver it"); Fraser v. Nation-
wide Mut. Ins. Co., 135 F. Supp. 2d 623, 636 (E.D. Pa. 2001) ("Retrieval of a message
from post-transmission storage is not covered by the Stored Communications Act. The
Act provides protection only for messages while they are in the course of transmission."),
aff'd on other grounds, 352 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 2003). But see Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359
F.3d at 1076-77; infra notes 254-274 (discussing Theofel)o.
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SCA at all. With respect to software designed to generate targeted adver-
tising, the proprietary nature of the software makes it difficult to determine
whether the products are operating in such a way as to collect temporarily
stored communications. Moreover, the SCA was not designed as a general
hacking statute to protect the computers of network end-users. Rather, the
statute was designed to protect storage systems of service providers. In
other words, the SCA is a narrow statute designed to protect communica-
tions at a certain point in the communications process.
In discussing the application of the SCA to spyware, I do not intend to
suggest that a court would lack room to interpret the SCA broadly to en-
compass some objectionable conduct. I have already alluded to the fact
that electronic surveillance law generally, and the SCA in particular, is
somewhat unstable and not predictably applied by courts. More specifi-
cally, courts have tended to push the envelope in terms of applying the
SCA to certain troubling privacy-invasive practices. In the case of the
SCA, however, many judicial approaches simply cannot be justified under
any appropriate canons of statutory construction. In limiting my discus-
sion of such cases in my predictive analysis, I do not intend to overlook
them. As discussed in Part IV, I am simply skeptical that such broad inter-
pretations of the SCA will have any significant privacy benefits.
D. Conclusion
In sum, electronic surveillance statutes, by their terms, do not operate
to regulate spyware activities in any comprehensive way. 168 Surveillance
168. I have not discussed another alternative for challenging spyware practices: the
CFAA, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000 & Supp. II 2002). The statute is not truly a surveillance
statute, and a full discussion of it is therefore beyond the scope of this Article. It is never-
theless interesting to note something of a paradox: that despite the fact that the CFAA
and related doctrines are mainly designed to respond to concerns about computer security
rather than concerns about privacy, plaintiffs are more likely to have success pursuing
spyware-related claims under the CFAA and analogous state law doctrines than they are
under surveillance law statutes.
The most relevant provision of the CFAA is § 1030(a)(2), which prohibits one
from "intentionally access[ing] a protected computer without authorization or ex-
ceed[ing] authorized access and thereby obtain[ing] . . . information from any protected
computer if the conduct involved an interstate or foreign communication." Id.
§ 1030(a)(2). Because the CFAA requires a showing that any access to a computer was
without authorization or exceeded authorized access, it raises a consent or authorization
similar to the Wiretap Act and the SCA. See supra Parts II.B.2, II.C.2. But where a plain-
tiff can overcome the authorization problem-as, for example, when a defendant's instal-
lation of spyware was truly surreptitious-a CFAA claim in theory would be more likely
to succeed than a Wiretap Act claim or an SCA claim. A plaintiff would not need to show
for purposes of the Wiretap Act that communications were acquired contemporaneously
with their transmission and not when purely internal to the computer system; and a plain-
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law will combat only narrow categories of spyware: perhaps keystroke
monitors, but only if courts can move past the problem of applying the
"electronic communication" definition to data purely internal to a com-
puter; and perhaps certain software designed to generate targeted advertis-
ing, but only if such software was installed surreptitiously or if a court
finds that the user's consent was otherwise deficient.
The spyware story is not an unusual one. In a wide variety of contexts,
plaintiffs have invoked electronic surveillance statutes in an attempt to
curb certain privacy-invasive practices involving electronic communica-
tions. The next Part explores why surveillance law statutes have been and
are likely to remain of marginal value in responding to a range of digital-
age privacy threats.
IV. SURVEILLANCE LAW'S LIMITS
The discussion in Part III illustrates significant problems with applying
tiff would not need to show for purposes of the SCA that the defendant gained access to a
"facility through which an electronic communication service is provided" or that the
communications acquired were in "electronic storage."
A civil litigant will nevertheless face one significant obstacle under the CFAA:
that of meeting the statute's $5000 threshold for economic damages. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030(g) (creating civil cause of action but specifying that underlying conduct must in-
volve one of five "factors" set forth in § 1030(a)(5)(B)); id. § 1030(a)(5)(B)(i) (requiring,
except with respect to action brought by government, a "loss to 1 or more persons during
any 1-year period ... aggregating at least $5000 in value"). Of course, an impediment
such as a $5000 loss threshold is a purely technical one that could be overcome by a leg-
islative change. Moreover, the $5000 threshold does not leave a plaintiff entirely without
a remedy: it simply reserves federal court involvement for the most serious claims, while
funneling less significant claims into statute courts under analogous state statutes or com-
mon-law trespass to chattels claims.
This possibility that plaintiffs challenging spyware practices will be more suc-
cessful with CFAA claims or analogous state law claims raises something of a paradox
with respect to the spyware problem. What tends to make the forms of spyware discussed
here objectionable is not merely the fact that in some cases the device or software is sur-
reptitiously installed, but rather that spyware tools can acquire vast amounts of private
information. It is that fact that at first blush seems to make surveillance law an attractive
avenue to pursue. Statutes such as the CFAA and state law analogues can reasonably re-
spond to issues of surreptitious installation, but they address the privacy concerns only
incidentally-for the CFAA, by virtue of § 1030(a)(2)'s prohibition on gathering "infor-
mation," and for common law trespass, only because the acquisition of private informa-
tion may constitute a cognizable harm. In other words, even where significant privacy-
invasive practices are at issue, a statute such as the CFAA--designed not to protect pri-
vacy but to guarantee security-seems to be a better conceptual fit than surveillance law
statutes. The next Part considers why it is that surveillance law statutes respond so poorly
to digital privacy threats.
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surveillance law statutes to spyware. Two questions follow. First, why do
surveillance law statutes respond so poorly, despite the privacy implica-
tions of spyware? Second, could surveillance law provide a more useful
framework if more aggressively interpreted by the courts?
In exploring these questions, it is helpful to place the spyware problem
in the broader context of efforts to use electronic surveillance law to ad-
dress digital-age privacy challenges. As I will show, the spyware story is
not unique. Litigants and commentators frequently assume that surveil-
lance statutes provide appropriate vehicles for responding to such per-
ceived privacy threats as online profiling and employer monitoring of
communications, but such claims rarely succeed. The cases in which they
do succeed involve unusual facts that are not generalizable across a broad
class of cases. Although I do not address the merits of the disputed prac-
tices, I explain in Section A why efforts to enhance digital privacy through
litigation have largely failed.
I then turn in the remainder of this Part to the normative question of
whether courts should more aggressively interpret surveillance statutes to
provide broader privacy-protective functions, at least in disputes involving
private parties. In other words, if we agree that certain spyware practices
(or other disputed practices involving electronic communications) should
be curbed, is electronic surveillance law an appropriate vehicle for doing
so-particularly since courts have managed to arrive at privacy-protective
outcomes in some instances? I argue that aggressive judicial interpreta-
tions of surveillance statutes have failed to achieve lasting privacy bene-
fits. In Section B, I offer three examples of courts' attempts to adopt pri-
vacy-protective interpretations in cases involving rather bad facts. As the
examples illustrate, such interpretations can do considerable violence to
the statutory text or legislative intent. Moreover, as Section C demon-
strates, privacy-protective outcomes have a way of unraveling, perhaps as
a result of the cases' vulnerability to criticism on statutory interpretation
grounds. For each case involving a privacy-protective result, one can iden-
tify or predict a privacy-destructive response. Finally, in Section D, I show
how decisions that reach privacy-protective results, despite textual and
other impediments, can derail legislative momentum by giving the impres-
sion that only minor, piecemeal statutory changes are necessary to address
problems that in fact should be the subject of far broader reforms.
A. The Spyware Problem in Context
The challenges of applying surveillance law to spyware are not unique.
Litigants and commentators have increasingly invoked electronic surveil-
lance statutes in an effort to curb perceived privacy-invasive practices in-
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volving electronic communications. Such efforts usually encounter the
same impediments as discussed in Part 111. Attempts to use surveillance
law to challenge employer monitoring of communications or to challenge
online profiling activities provide useful examples. With respect to claims
that employer monitoring violates surveillance statutes, the employer's
efforts to acquire the employee's consent to the monitoring will typically
defeat any Wiretap Act claim, even if communications are monitored dur-
ing the transmission phase. SCA claims typically fail because the em-
ployer acts as a service provider and thus could "authorize" the conduct in
question. I have already discussed some aspects of the online profiling
cases-that is, cases involving third-party advertisers' use of cookies to
gather data across a range of websites. As noted, both Wiretap Act and
SCA claims have typically foundered on the consent element.
1 69
In observing that efforts to use litigation to improve privacy practices
with respect to electronic communications have generally been unsuccess-
ful, I do not intend to suggest that privacy-protective outcomes do not ex-
ist-or, for that matter, that decisions rejecting Wiretap Act or SCA
claims are incorrect. In cases involving particularly bad facts, courts have
on occasion allowed surveillance law claims to proceed. With respect to
employer monitoring, the case of Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.,
170
which involved a supervisor gaining access to an employee's password-
protected website, comes to mind. In that case, the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit rejected a Wiretap Act claim but allowed an SCA claim
to proceed past the summary judgment phase. 17 1 The unique facts of the
case-including that the employer did not act as a service provider with
respect to the communications in question-make the case sufficiently
narrow that it is unlikely to influence subsequent decisions involving more
conventional facts. Moreover, as noted below, the Konop case itself in-
volves a highly questionable application of the SCA.172 With respect to the
use of cookies, the Pharmatrak decision reflects one instance in which a
court allowed a Wiretap Act claim to proceed even though the companies
whose websites facilitated Pharmatrak's placement of cookies on users'
computers arranged for Pharmatrak's services.1 73 In addition, even the
169. See supra notes 124-133 and accompanying text; see also infra note 245 and
accompanying text.
170. 302 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002).
171. As discussed below, the court initially allowed the Wiretap Act claim to proceed
but abandoned its analysis following a petition for rehearing. See infra notes 277-293 and
accompanying text.
172. See infra note 293.
173. See supra notes 134-141 and accompanying text.
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cookie cases preceding Pharmatrak are interesting in that they rely on
consent as the basis for dismissal, when the plaintiffs' claims could poten-
tially have foundered on a number of other grounds (a point to which I re-
turn below). The next Section discusses several other cases in which
courts faced with bad facts have attempted to draw certain privacy-
invasive conduct within the domain of surveillance law.
For our purposes, the interesting question is whether those cases in-
volving unsuccessful challenges to privacy-invasive conduct are the result
of reasonable application of statutes that are simply too narrow to reach
the challenged conduct or the result of misinterpretation. After reading
many of the cases that attempt to apply surveillance statutes, particularly
to private conduct, one might conclude that cases rejecting surveillance
law claims simply reflect confused application of very complex statutes.
Courts routinely report substantial confusion concerning how to apply
surveillance statutes, 174 particularly with respect to some of the issues dis-
cussed earlier in this Article-such as how to draw the line between the
Wiretap Act and the SCA 175 and what it means for a communication to be
in electronic storage.'
76
My own view, however, is that the failure of electronic surveillance
law to curb or reform seemingly privacy-invasive practices is mainly at-
tributable to the problem of narrow drafting rather than the problem of
misinterpretation. In particular, ECPA pre-dates the development of our
electronic communications infrastructure. 177 Certain electronic communi-
cation services existed in 1986, and Congress recognized that such ser-
vices were unlikely to be widely used unless it provided some statutory
protection for electronic communications. 178 The technical aspects in-
volved in the transmission of a communication were largely the same as
174. See, e.g., Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 462 (5th
Cir. 1994) (calling Wiretap Act "famous (if not infamous) for its lack of clarity"); United
States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 1998) (suggesting that Steve Jackson
Games court "might have put the matter too mildly"); Konop, 302 F.3d at 874 ("Courts
have struggled to analyze problems involving modem technology within the confines of
this statutory framework, often with unsatisfying results.").
175. See supra note 34 and accompanying text; infra notes 183-189, 281-293 and
accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 162-167 and accompanying text; infra notes 254-274 and ac-
companying text.
177. See, e.g., Konop, 302 F.3d at 874 (noting that complexity of surveillance law "is
compounded by the fact that ECPA was written prior to the advent of the Internet and the
World Wide Web" and that "the existing statutory framework is ill-suited to address
modem forms of communication").
178. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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they are today, in that messages were stored regularly as part of the trans-
mission process. 179 In addition, it was not uncommon for businesses to
contract for off-site computer storage or processing services; Congress
thus also understood the need to protect such remotely stored files.' But
the Internet as we know it did not exist in 1986. Congress simply did not
envision how concepts such as "electronic communication," "electronic
communication service," "facility," and "electronic storage" would map
onto the Internet.
One example will suffice to illustrate how the~concepts reflected in the
Wiretap Act and the SCA are difficult to map onto the Internet more
broadly. Under the Wiretap Act, acquisition of communications with the
consent of one party are not considered unlawful interceptions;' 8 simi-
larly, conduct undertaken with the consent of a user of an electronic com-
munication service will not run afoul of the SCA. 182 A consent exception
under the original version of the Wiretap Act may have been quite sensi-
ble, in that any wire or oral communication likely would have involved a
relatively small number of parties, with respect to whom the speaker could
gauge the risk that the conversation would be recorded or revealed. The
extension of the concept to electronic communications is similarly under-
standable when a relatively small number of parties are involved. The
concept of one-party consent, however, becomes meaningless when ap-
plied not to personal communications, but to arms'-length transactions-
where a user does not or cannot know of the contractual arrangements the
other party may have with third parties and therefore lacks the data to
gauge the privacy risks involved.
But even if courts could adequately address issues of consent and map
other statutory terms onto the Internet, a more fundamental problem ex-
ists: our surveillance law statutes, as written, simply are not general data
privacy statutes. In other words, the statutes do not broadly identify a par-
ticular category of personal data that should be subject to protection or re-
strict the acquisition, use, or transfer of such data. The Wiretap Act deals
narrowly with communications that are transmitted, not with any other
179. See, e.g., Brief on Rehearing En Banc of Amicus Curiae Technical Experts In
Support of Appellant, Urging Reversal, United States v. Councilman 6-8 (1st Cir. Nov.
12, 2004) (No. 03-1383), available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/councilman/tech_
amicus.pdf (noting that technical specifications for e-mail were developed prior to
ECPA's passage in 1986).
180. See S. REP. No. 99-541, at 10 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555,
3564.
181. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c), (d) (2000).
182. Id. § 2701(c)(2).
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data that an individual might attempt to shield or any other process by
which it might be revealed. The SCA protects only communications, and
only at a very specific point in the communications process: in electronic
storage in the system of an electronic communications service.
That is not to say that all cases rejecting Wiretap Act or SCA claims
are properly decided. For example, the IJ.S. Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit, sitting en banc, recently reversed a highly problematic decision
dismissing a Wiretap Act claim. In United States v. Councilman,183 a dis-
trict court considered whether an Internet service provider that captured
communications of its customers before transmitting them into users'
mailboxes had intercepted those communications. The communications
were acquired during a brief period of storage in the ISP's system before
transmission to the user's mailbox. 184 Because the communications were
acquired during this brief period of storage, the district court concluded
that the communications were not intercepted for purposes of the Wiretap
Act. 185 A panel of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed on
the same reasoning.1
86
Although several courts construing the Wiretap Act had held that the
statute does not protect stored communications, 87 those cases differed
from Councilman in an important respect. The previous cases each in-
volved a one-time acquisition of communications maintained by a service
providerfor retrieval by the subscriber. Councilman, in contrast, involved
an ongoing acquisition of communications briefly stored during the
transmission process prior to being made available to the subscriber. The
implications of the district court's and panel majority's conclusion for
electronic communications were profound. By virtue of the architecture of
the Internet, electronic communications are stored at numerous points dur-
ing transmission. Under the district court's and panel majority's reasoning,
a communication would move in and out of the Wiretap Act's protective
umbrella depending upon whether, at a given moment in time, the com-
munication was between or within the computers relaying it.
The en banc court's reversal of the Councilman decision was thus a
welcome result. The case nevertheless highlights one of the real difficul-
183. 245 F. Supp. 2d 319 (D. Mass. 2003) [hereinafter Councilman 1], affd, 373 F.3d
197 (1st Cir.) [hereinafter Councilman 11], reh 'g en banc granted and opinion withdrawn,
385 F.3d 793 (1st Cir. 2004), on reh'g en banc, No. 03-1383, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS
16803 (1st Cir. Aug. 11, 2005).
184. Councilman 11, 373 F.3d at 199.
185. Councilman 1, 245 F. Supp. 2d at 321.
186. Councilman 11, 373 F.3d at 204.
187. See supra note 34 (citing cases).
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ties in applying surveillance law to private conduct. I discussed in Part II
the fact that understanding the Fourth Amendment backdrop to each stat-
ute is crucial to applying the relevant terminology. This point is often
missed by courts construing the statutes in cases involving civil or crimi-
nal actions against private parties rather than in the context of a motion to
suppress evidence gathered by the government. 188 In Councilman, the dis-
trict court's and panel majority's conclusion that a service provider can
acquire the contents of a communication prior to completion of the trans-
mission phase, merely because it is stored at a point in the transmission
process, would have dramatically expanded the government's access to
electronic communications: the government could have relied on the less
stringent procedures of the SCA to compel production of a communication
at any one of a number of points along its transmission path, rather than
obtaining a Title III order.189 Had the courts fully considered that fact, it
seems unlikely that they would have reached the same result. Courts ap-
plying statutes to private conduct in isolation, without attention to the
manner in which interpretations affect government conduct, are likely to
apply surveillance statutes erroneously. Those errors, of course, can run in
either direction: sanctioning privacy-invasive conduct by private parties,
thereby opening avenues for the government to engage in the same con-
duct, and limiting privacy-invasive conduct, thereby constraining investi-
gative tools available to the government.
Even if we accept that interpretation of surveillance statutes is diffi-
cult, and that some cases rejecting Wiretap Act or SCA claims are errone-
ous, the fact remains that surveillance law statutes are very narrowly
drafted, and that much privacy-invasive conduct with respect to electronic
communications remains outside of their terms. 19° That observation begs
188. See Orin S. Kerr, Lifting the "Fog" of Internet Surveillance: How a Suppression
Remedy Would Change Computer Crime Law, 54 HAST. L.J. 805, 807 (2003) ("[C]ourts
have not explained how the complex web of surveillance statutes apply in routine crimi-
nal cases, but instead have interpreted those statutes in unexpected civil contexts where
the implications of the court's decision for the bulk of criminal cases tends to be un-
known to the court and ignored by the parties.").
189. See, e.g., Brief on Rehearing En Banc for Senator Patrick J. Leahy as Amicus
Curiae Supporting the United States and Urging Reversal, United States v. Councilman
10-11 (1st Cir. Nov. 12, 2004) (No. 03-1383), available at http://www.cdt.org
/wiretap/20041112leahy.pdf; Supplemental Brief of Center for Democracy and Technol-
ogy et al., United States v. Councilman 1-4 (1st Cir. Nov. 12, 2004) (No. 03-1383),
available at http://www.cdt.org/wiretap/20041112joint.pdf.
190. For another view that surveillance statutes are narrowly drafted and that courts
erroneously apply them to a range of conduct, see Kerr, supra note 188, at 807 (arguing
that surveillance law "remains unusually obscure, and the rare judicial decisions constru-
ing the statutes tend to confuse the issues, not clarify them").
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the question of whether courts should more aggressively interpret surveil-
lance statutes to provide broader privacy-protective functions, at least in
cases involving private parties. The remainder of this Part explores that
question. I argue that aggressive interpretations of surveillance statutes are
unlikely to achieve lasting privacy benefits. Although one could offer a
range of examples of privacy-protective but deeply flawed applications of
surveillance law, I focus on three examples in particular: United States v.
Smith,1 91 In re Pharmatrak Privacy Litigation'92 (and its antecedents), and
Theofel v. Farey-Jones.193 I begin by explaining the difficulties each case
presents as a matter of statutory interpretation; I then explore the broader
consequences of the courts' approaches for privacy and for legislative
momentum.
B. Deconstructing Courts' "Privacy-Protective" Approaches
1. United States v. Smith
United States v. Smith dealt with a frequently litigated and extremely
complex issue: how the Wiretap Act's prohibition on interception of
communications relates to the SCA's prohibition on acquisition of com-
munications in electronic storage.' 94 Although the case concerned wire
communications rather than electronic communications, the implications
of the decision for electronic communications were potentially quite sig-
nificant. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ultimately concluded
that a private party could "intercept" a voicemail message even when the
message was acquired from electronic storage within the voicemail pro-
vider's system.' 95 The court's effort to reconcile its interpretation of the
Wiretap Act with the existence of the SCA, however, resulted in an ex-
tremely confused interpretation of both statutes.
In Smith, a third party acquired the contents of a voicemail message by
guessing a co-worker's password; 196 the message revealed possible insider
trading. 97 Section 2511 prohibits the interception of a wire communica-
tion, whereas § 2701(a) of the SCA creates civil and criminal liability for
one who "intentionally accesses without authorization a facility through
which an electronic communication service is provided . . . and thereby
191. 155 F.3d 1051 (9thCir. 1998).
192. 329 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2003).
193. 341 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003), reh'g denied and opinion superseded, 359 F.3d
1066 (9th Cir. 2004).
194. Smith, 155 F.3d at 1055.
195. Id. at 1059.
196. Id. at 1054.
197. Id. at 1053.
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obtains ... a wire ... communication while it is in electronic storage in
such system."' 98 The determination of which statute governs the acquisi-
tion of a voicemail message by a private party is important, because
§ 2515 of the Wiretap Act requires exclusion of any wire or oral commu-
nication that has been illegally intercepted, 99 whereas the SCA lacks such
an exclusionary rule.20 0 In a criminal trial on the insider trading charges,
the district court suppressed a tape of the voicemail message on the theory
that it had been intercepted. 20 1 The district court declined to suppress other
evidence despite the defendant's claim that it was derived from the ille-
gally intercepted voicemail message.
20 2
When the defendant challenged this ruling on appeal of his conviction,
the government argued that the district court was correct to rule that the
203evidence was not derived from the voicemail message. As an alternative
basis for affirmance, the government also argued that the voicemail mes-
sage was not in fact intercepted within the meaning of the Wiretap Act.
Rather, the government suggested, the third party's retrieval of the voice-
mail message violated only § 2701(a) of the SCA; thus, any evidence de-
rived from the acquisition did not need to be suppressed. In other words,
the government argued that § 2511 covers acquisition of a communication
only while it is being transmitted, while § 2701(a) covers acquisition of a
communication once it is in storage.
204
Although the court ultimately concluded that the evidence in question
was not derived from the voicemail message, 205 it treated the govern-
ment's claim that the SCA, and not the Wiretap Act, governed the case as
a "threshold issue., 20 6 The court rejected the government's transmis-
sion/storage distinction and concluded that a private party could "inter-
cept" a stored voicemail message. 20 7 The court acknowledged that the
government's narrower interpretation of the Wiretap Act comported with
the ordinary meaning of the term "intercept"-"'to take, seize, or stop by
the way or before arrival at the destined place"'-but concluded that this
198. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a)(1) (2000).
199. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (2000).
200. The SCA allows for civil damages and criminal penalties and deems those
remedies exclusive. See 18 U.S.C. § 2707 (2000 & Supp. II 2002) (civil action); id.
§ 2701(b) (criminal penalties); id. § 2708 (exclusivity of remedies).
201. Smith, 155 F.3d at 1054.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1055.
204. Id. at 1056-57.
205. Id. at 1063.
206. Id. at 1055.
207. Id. at 1059.
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ordinary meaning did not control.2 °8 The court's reasoning rested in part
on a feature of the Wiretap Act that was later eliminated (subject to a sun-
set provision) in the USA Patriot Act. In particular, § 2510(1) had defined
the term "wire communication" to cover "any electronic storage of such
communication" 20 9; the USA Patriot Act temporarily excised this portion
of the definition.
210
The court's approach suffers from numerous flaws. First, if acquisition
of a voicemail message from electronic storage is an interception, then
§ 2701(a)'s coverage of the acquisition of wire communications from elec-
tronic storage is redundant or nonsensical. The court attempted to deflect
this argument by reasoning that the Wiretap Act and the SCA cover two
different things: the Wiretap Act prohibits acquiring the contents of the
communication, whether the communication is in transit or in storage,
whereas the SCA prohibits gaining "access" to a communication-with
"access" understood to mean conduct that puts a person "in position to ac-
quire the contents of a communication." 211 In other words, under the Smith
court's reasoning, the Wiretap Act covers the acquisition of the communi-
cation, whereas the SCA covers preliminary conduct placing one in posi-
tion to acquire a communication. There are significant problems with this
approach. First, in reaching its conclusion, the court conflated two differ-
ent uses of the word "access" in § 2701(a) and altered the grammatical
structure of the prohibition. Section 2701(a) covers one who "intentionally
accesses" a "facility" through which an electronic communication service
is provided. Drawing on this language, the court observed that the Wiretap
Act refers "pointedly" to intercepting a particular communication, while
§ 2701 refers "broadly" to accessing a communications facility.212 The
court reasoned that "[o]ne assuredly can access a communications facil-
ity-such as a company voicemail system-without listening to or re-
cording any of the messages stored within that facility."213 The court im-
plied that such conduct, without more, would violate the SCA.214 Section
2701(a), however, requires more than gaining access to a covered facility:
one must also "obtain[], alter[], or prevent[] authorized access to a wire or
208. Id. at 1057 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1176
(1986)) (emphasis in opinion).
209. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (2000).
210. See Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 209(1), 115 Stat. at 283 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(1) (Supp. 11 2002)); id. § 224, 115 Stat. at 295 (applying sunset provision to
§ 209).
211. Smith, 155 F.3d at 1058 (emphasis added).
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electronic communication while it is in electronic storage in such system."
In other words, the conclusion that merely being in a position to acquire
the contents of a communication violates the SCA requires excising the
last portion of the prohibition, and focusing on "access[] to a facility" as
the sole prohibited conduct.
The court also looked to the second appearance of the word "access"
in § 2701(a) and concluded that to "obtain[] ... access" is to be in a posi-
tion to acquire its contents, not to actually acquire those contents. Even if
that were an appropriate reading of the phrase "obtain[] . . . access," one
must alter the grammatical structure of the prohibition to conclude that
"obtain[] ... access" is the operative phrase in the statute. As noted, Sec-
tion 2701(a) reaches "whoever... intentionally accesses without authori-
zation a facility through which an electronic communication service is
provided.., and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to
a wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage."215 In
reading the provision to prohibit one from "obtain[ing] . . access" to a
communication, however, the court assumes that "access" is the direct ob-
ject of the verb "obtains." Under this approach, the statute reaches one
who "obtains . . . access to a wire or electronic communication, .... al-
ters ... access to a wire or electronic communication," or "prevents au-
thorized access to a wire or electronic communication." The phrase "alters
... access" is awkward; the more natural reading of the prohibition is that
it reaches one who "obtains ... a wire or electronic communication," "al-
ters ... a wire or electronic communication," or "prevents authorized ac-
cess to a wire or electronic communication." When so read, the prohibi-
tion does not in fact cover gaining access to a facility and thereby "ob-
tain[ing] . . . access" to a communication in electronic storage. Rather, it
covers gaining access to a facility and thereby "obtain[ing] . . . a commu-
nication" in electronic storage. The court's conclusion that the SCA covers
only conduct that places one in a position to obtain the contents of a com-
munication is thus flawed. The court's interpretation of the Wiretap Act
does render the SCA, properly read, redundant, because both statutes
would cover acquisition of a stored wire communication.
The Smith court also buttressed its conclusion by focusing on the defi-
216
nition of "wire communication" under the Wiretap Act. Prior to the pas-
sage of the USA Patriot Act, § 2510(1) defined a wire communication to
include storage of such a communication. The Smith court reasoned that
the inclusion of that phrase would be rendered meaningless if stored wire
215. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (2000).
216. Smith, 155 F.3d at 1058.
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217communications could not be intercepted. Here, the court ignored the
most likely explanation for the reference to stored wire communications in
§ 2510(1). Prior to the passage of the USA Patriot Act, the SCA in fact
required the government to seek a Title III order before acquiring the con-
tents of any wire communication in electronic storage. Section 2701(a)
prohibits the acquisition of wire or electronic communications in elec-
tronic storage, but § 2701(c)(3) exempts authorized government con-
duct-specifically, prior to the Patriot Act's passage, conduct authorized
under §§ 2703 and 2704 of ECPA and under § 2518 of the Wiretap Act.
218
Prior to the passage of the USA Patriot Act, and when Smith was decided,
the first two of these provisions described only how the government may
compel a service provider to produce or preserve the contents of stored
electronic communications: subsections (a) and (b) of § 2703 established
the means by which law enforcement officials could require a service pro-
vider to disclose the contents of electronic communications, 219 while
§ 2704 authorized the government to require a service provider to create a
backup copy of the contents of electronic communications pending resolu-
tion of any proceedings concerning the government's subpoena or court
order. 22 Because both § 2703 and § 2704 omitted reference to any process
by which the government could obtain or compel production of the con-
tents of stored wire communications,221 the reference in § 2701(c) to
§ 2518-the provision of the Wiretap Act under which a court grants an
order authorizing law enforcement conduct-could only relate to govern-
ment access to stored wire communications.
Accordingly, at the time Smith was decided, if the government wished
to acquire wire communications in electronic storage without violating
§ 2701(a), it had to obtain a Title III order.222 The report of the House
Committee on the Judiciary accompanying ECPA confirms this reading of
the statute. The analysis of § 2703, which, as noted, then governed access
to the contents of electronic communications in electronic storage, states:
217. See id. at 1058 & n.12.
218. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(3) (2000).
219. Id. § 2703(a), (b).
220. Id. § 2704.
221. Section 2703(d), which set forth circumstances under which a court may order a
service provider to disclose a communication, did refer to "the contents of a wire . . .
communication." Since the government could only seek an order under § 2703(d) for
disclosure of electronic communications, see id. § 2703(b)(1)(B)(ii), and subscriber or
customer records, see id. § 2703(c)(1)(B), the reference was apparently inadvertent.
222. The USA Patriot Act altered this requirement by adding procedures to compel
production of wire communications to §§ 2703(a) and (b). See Pub. L. No. 107-56,
§ 209(2), 115 Stat. at 283 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(a), (b) (Supp. 112002)).
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"The contents of the voice portion of a wire communication in storage
such as with 'voice mail' may not be obtained under this section. [T]he
provisions of chapter 119 of title 18 [i.e., the Wiretap Act] apply. '223 As
this discussion suggests, the inclusion of "electronic storage" within the
definition of a "wire communication" in the Wiretap Act served only to
emphasize the procedure that law enforcement officials had to follow to
gain access to voicemail messages. Under this reading, one can conclude
that a private party's acquisition of stored communications violates only
the SCA and still give effect to the phrase "electronic storage" in the defi-
nition of "wire communication."
Finally, in concluding that acquisition of voicemail message consti-
tutes an interception for purposes of the Wiretap Act, the Smith court ef-
fectively held that the single prohibition on intercepting communications
in § 2511(1)(a) would have a different meaning depending on whether
wire or electronic communications were at issue. Cases addressing
whether acquisition of electronic communications in electronic storage
violates not only the SCA but also the Wiretap Act have held that the
Wiretap Act only governs the acquisition of communications during
224transmission. Prior to the passage of the USA Patriot Act, some courts
reaching that conclusion relied in part on the inclusion of the phrase "elec-
tronic storage" in the definition of a wire communication and the exclu-
sion of that phrase in the definition of an electronic communication. 225 The
Smith court distinguished those cases on that basis.226 The effect of the
Smith decision, however, is that "intercept" is defined differently depend-
ing on the type of communication: for wire communications, intercept
223. H.R. Rep. No. 99-647, at 67-68 (emphasis added); see also S. Rep. No. 99-541,
at 12, as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3566 (noting that amendment to definition of
"wire communication" to include "any electronic storage of such communication" was
designed "to specify that wire communications in storage like voice mail, remain wire
communications, and are protected accordingly"). The House Report's reference to "the
voice portion" of a wire communication is somewhat opaque, as a wire communication
by definition contains the human voice. The error appears to be a relic of an earlier ver-
sion of ECPA, in which § 2703(a) applied to government access to "non-voice wire
communications." In any event, the Report's statement that Title III applies to stored
voice communications is unambiguous.
224. See Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 113-14 (3d Cir. 2003);
Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir. 1994); Wesley
Coll. v. Pitts, 974 F. Supp. 375, 388 (D. Del. 1997), affd, 172 F.3d 861 (3d Cir. 1998);
Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232, 1236 (D. Nev. 1996); United States v. Reyes,
922 F. Supp. 818, 837 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
225. See Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 461-62; Wesley Coll., 974 F. Supp. at 386;
Reyes, 922 F. Supp. at 836.
226. Smith, 155 F.3d at 1057.
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means the acquisition of a communication in transit or in electronic stor-
age, but for electronic communications, intercept means only the acquisi-
tion of a communication in transit. That approach overlooks the fact that,
under the Wiretap Act, all communications are encompassed in a single
prohibition providing for criminal punishment and a private right of action
against one who "intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or pro-
cures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral,
or electronic communication." 2 7 To assign a different meaning of the
term, depending on whether a wire or electronic communication was at
issue, would be highly anomalous.228
Smith is illustrative of how courts can do violence to statutory text by
reading electronic surveillance statutes in privacy-protective ways. Al-
though the Smith court ultimately denied the defendant's motion to sup-
press, 229 the decision was privacy-protective in that the court would have
applied the more restrictive provisions of the Wiretap Act to the defen-
dant's conduct. As discussed below, however, Smith is among the privacy-
protective cases that have in some sense unraveled.
2. In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litigation and its Antecedents
In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litigation and the "cookie" cases that
preceded it provide a second example of courts reading surveillance stat-
utes too broadly. As previously noted, the cases typically involved claims
that use of cookies violated the Wiretap Act, the SCA, and the CFAA.23°.... 231
In re Pharmatrak Privacy Litigation presents a rare example of a case in
which a claim that placement of a cookie on a user's hard drive, coupled
with other conduct, violated a surveillance law statute was allowed to pro-
ceed. In particular, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit overturned a
227. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (2000).
228. The discussion above suggests that the court's textual and structural arguments
are unpersuasive. The court also dismissed the Senate and House reports accompanying
ECPA because it found the reports' discussions of whether the wiretap provisions or the
stored communications provisions govern acquisition of stored communications to be
inconsistent: The Senate report suggests that stored wire communications are protected
by Title III, while the House report suggests that they are subject to the stored communi-
cations access provisions of ECPA. See Smith, 155 F.3d at 1056 n.9. The reports, how-
ever, can be easily reconciled, on the theory that the Senate report is focusing on govern-
ment access to stored wire communications (which must occur via a Title III order) and
the House report is focusing on non-governmental access to stored communications
(which is regulated by the prohibitions of § 2701(a) of the SCA). See supra notes 217-
223 and accompanying text.
229. Smith, 155 F.3d at 1063.
230. See supra notes 123-142 and accompanying text.
231. PharmatrakII, 329 F.3d at 9.
20051
BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
district court's grant of summary judgment to Pharmatrak on a Wiretap
Act claim. 232 The court of appeals' reasoning, though privacy-protective,
has significant problems. Some of those problems simply build upon prob-
lems in prior "cookie" cases. Although most of the cookie cases preceding
Pharmatrak resulted in summary judgment to the defendant or dismissal,
they reflect unusual and unduly broad interpretations of portions of the
electronic surveillance statutes.
The first and most important. case in the series of cookie cases was In
re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litigation,233 a class action suit by individuals
alleging that DoubleClick's use of cookies resulted in the unauthorized
acquisition of personally identifiable information in violation of federal
law.234 Although the court granted DoubleClick's motion to dismiss the
Wiretap Act and SCA claims on the ground that DoubleClick's conduct
fell within exceptions in each statute for certain consensual conduct,235 the
court assumed, or DoubleClick conceded, that certain substantive predi-
cates for liability with respect to each statute were met.236 Despite the fact
that other portions of the opinion rendered the DoubleClick court's con-
clusion with respect to the substantive predicate for liability dictum, the
DoubleClick court's framework paved the way for other courts to take a
similar approach, with some bizarre consequences.
the premise of the DoubleClick plaintiffs' claim that use of cookies
violated the Wiretap Act was that DoubleClick had acquired private in-
formation when interaction between the plaintiffs' computers and Dou-
bleClick-affiliated websites caused that information to be incorporated
into a URL. 237 The plaintiffs claimed that acquisition of the communica-
tions constituted an interception. 238 DoubleClick's motion to dismiss
rested on the view that any interception was undertaken with the consent
232. See Pharmatrak I, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 12 (granting summary judgment on Wire-
tap Act claim), rev'd, Pharmatrak 11, 329 F.3d at 9. The court of appeals remanded for
further consideration of whether Pharmatrak's conduct satisfied the intent requirement of
the Wiretap Act. On remand, the district court again granted summary judgment to Phar-
matrak. 292 F. Supp. 2d 263 (D. Mass. 2003).
233. 154 F. Supp. 2d497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
234. For discussion of the factual basis for the claims, see supra notes 127-131 and
accompanying text.
235. DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 514, 519.
236. See id. at 508 ("Assuming the communications are considered to be in 'elec-
tronic storage,' it appears that plaintiffs have adequately pled that DoubleClick's conduct
constitutes an offense under § 2701(a) . . . ."); id. at 514 (noting DoubleClick's conces-
sion for purposes of motion to dismiss that its conduct, as pled, violated Wiretap Act's
prohibition on interception).
237. See id. at 504; supra notes 130-131 and accompanying text.
238. DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 514.
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of a party to the communication-that is, the website for which Double-
Click had arranged to provide advertising. The DoubleClick court agreed.
The court apparently accepted DoubleClick's concession that the substan-
tive predicates for liability under the Wiretap Act were otherwise met. But
note the extremely awkward fit between DoubleClick's conduct and the
offense under the statute. Recall that the Wiretap Act prohibits the inter-
ception of electronic communications and defines "intercept" as "the aural
or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral com-
munication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other de-
vice.'239 Assuming that the personally identifiable information constitutes
the "communication" that was intercepted, it is not clear what "device"
DoubleClick used to intercept that communication. The cookie is not itself
an intercepting device; the cookie is merely stored on the user's hard drive
and communicated to DoubleClick by the user's browser at an appropriate
time. DoubleClick may associate information with this cookie in its own
database, but the cookie itself does not gather information. To the extent
that DoubleClick has access to personally identifiable information, it has
access because the user's browser and its client's site are configured in
such a way as to reveal this information. It is difficult to see how this con-
stitutes an interception on DoubleClick's part.
240
Although the court's ultimate conclusion that the DoubleClick-
affiliated sites did consent to any interception meant that the court's ap-
parent assumption that the substantive predicate for liability under the
Wiretap Act was met was of little consequence in DoubleClick itself, that
assumption essentially hardened into law in the court of appeals decision
in Pharmatrak. Recall that Pharmatrak tracked certain data for several
pharmaceutical company clients through the use of cookies.241 As in Dou-
bleClick, the plaintiffs claimed that Pharmatrak intercepted certain person-
ally identifiable information that they revealed to the pharmaceutical com-
panies by filling out electronic forms on the companies' websites. 242 The
court of appeals found that any "consent" by Pharmatrak's pharmaceutical
243
partners was too general to trigger the § 2511 (d) exception. 4 The Phar-
matrak court's underlying premise was that Pharmatrak's conduct satisfied
239. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (2000).
240. For related criticism of DoubleClick and its progeny, see Kerr, supra note 188,
at 830-33 (characterizing the court's interpretations as "hallucinogenic").
241. Pharmatrak II, 329 F.3d at 12.
242. Id. at 15-16.
243. Id. at 20 (concluding that mere purchase of service does not always imply con-
sent).
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the elements of § 2511(1)(a)244 -- except for the element of intent, as to
which the court remanded for further consideration. Again, however, any
information revealed to Pharmatrak was revealed because the user's
browser was configured to reveal it or because the pharmaceutical compa-
nies' sites were configured in such a way as to reveal it.
The reasoning of courts considering whether use of cookies violates
the SCA is equally problematic. There too, courts typically disposed of the
claims on the issue of consent-under the exception in § 2701(c)(2) for
conduct authorized "by a user of [a wire or electronic communication ser-
vice] with respect to a communication of or intended for that user."
245
Several courts glossed over the numerous problems with applying the
statutory framework at all, either by assuming the elements of the SCA
were met or relying on parties' concessions. I alluded to some of these
problems above in my discussion of spyware. First, it is difficult to iden-
tify a "facility through which an electronic communication service is pro-
vided" to which the content provider or advertiser gains unauthorized ac-
cess. 246 In DoubleClick, for example, the plaintiffs seemed to object to the
access that DoubleClick had to the user's hard drive in placing a
cookie.247 But even if the user's hard drive is properly viewed as a "facil-
ity"-a proposition that the DoubleClick district court and other courts
seemed to accept 248-that facility provides no electronic communications
service. The court treated "internet access" as the relevant electronic
communication service, 249 but if it is, then the user's hard drive is not a
"facility" through which this service is provided. 50
244. Id. at 18 (discussing elements).
245. See, e.g., Pharmatrakl, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 13-14; In re Toys R Us, Inc. Privacy
Litig., 2001 WL 34517252, at *6 (N.D. Cal. 2001); Chance v. Avenue A, 165 F. Supp. 2d
1153, 1161 (W.D. Wash. 2001); In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d
497, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). But see In re Intuit Privacy Litig., 138 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1275
(discussing consent exception, but stating that "[i]t is unclear to the court how this excep-
tion buttresses defendant's contention").
246. The Pharmatrak district court recognized this problem. See Pharmatrak I, 22'0
F. Supp. 2d at 13.
247. DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 509 (referring to "personal computer" as "facil-
ity").
248. See Toys R Us, 2001 WL 34517252, at *2 n.7 (describing defendant's interpreta-
tion of 'facility' as "limited"); Chance, 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1161 ("[I]t is possible to
conclude that modem computers, which serve as a conduit for the web server's commu-
nication to Avenue A, are facilities covered under the Act."); DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp.
at 508 (concluding that plaintiffs had adequately pled offense under § 2701(a)(1), and
thus implicitly assuming that hard drive constituted facility).
249. DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 508.
250. See Pharmatrak I, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 13 ("The relevant service is Internet ac-
1334 [Vol. 20:1283
20051
As noted, the DoubleClick court disposed of the SCA claim on a con-
sent theory. In particular, the court reasoned that its acquisition of com-
munications was authorized by the websites DoubleClick served, because
the communications were intended for the websites and the companies
providing primary content for sites had contracted with DoubleClick to
engage in profiling activities-even if the companies did not know the
specifics of whether DoubleClick would have access to personally identi-
fiable information. 2 5 Again, because of the court's ultimate conclusion
with respect to consent, its treatment of the other elements of the SCA
may not seem important. But the Pharmatrak case illustrates the difficulty
in this approach. Although the court of appeals in Pharmatrak did not ad-
dress the plaintiffs' claims under the SCA, 252 its disposition of the issue of
consent under the Wiretap Act suggests that it would reject the theory that
Pharmatrak's website clients authorized acquisition of the communica-
tions at issue for purposes of the SCA's consent exception. 253 As with the
Wiretap Act, then, the DoubleClick court's approach to the substantive
predicate for liability has the potential to harden into an accepted frame-
work for similar claims, despite the awkward fit with the statutory text.
3. Theofel v. Farey-Jones
Theofel v. Farey-Jones254 provides a final example of a privacy-
protective but deeply flawed application of surveillance law. A group of
plaintiffs alleged that Farey-Jones, a plaintiff in a separate civil suit in
which some of the Theofel plaintiffs were defendants, and his attorney im-
properly acquired their electronic communications.255 In the course of dis-
covery in the separate case, Farey-Jones's attorney issued a civil subpoena
seeking certain communications from the Theofel plaintiffs' ISP.25 6 The
subpoena was overbroad and was subsequently quashed,257 but only after
the ISP complied and turned over numerous communications unrelated to
the subject matter of Farey-Jones's lawsuit.258 The Theofel plaintiffs filed
cess, and the service is provided through ISPs or other servers, not [through] Plaintiffs'
PCs.").
251. DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 511.
252. The district court had granted Pharmatrak summary judgment on the SCA
claims, Pharmatrak I, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 14, and the plaintiffs apparently did not appeal
that disposition, Pharmatrak II, 329 F.3d at 13.
253. SeePharmatraklI,329F.3dat 19-22.
254. 341 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter Theofel 11, reh'g denied and opinion
superseded, 359 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2004) [hereinafter Theofel II].
255. TheofelI, 341 F.3d at 982.
256. Id. at 981.
257. Id. at 981-82.
258. Id. at 981.
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suit alleging violation of § 270 1(a) of the SCA.
259
The district court dismissed the SCA claim, apparently in part on the
theory that the defendants acquired the communications with the authori-
zation of the service provider.2 60 The ISP had provided the defendants
with access to the communications in response to the subpoena.26' Section
2701(a) only covers unauthorized access to a communications facility. In
addition, § 2701(c)(1) exempts from § 2701(a)'s coverage conduct author-
ized by the service provider.262 If the ISP authorized the defendants' ac-
cess, then § 2701(a) would not prohibit their conduct.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed.263 The
court analogized § 2701(a) of the SCA to a common-law trespass ac-
tion.264 Although a defendant is not liable for a trespass if the plaintiff au-
thorizes his conduct, in some circumstances (though not all) deceit will
vitiate consent.265 Here, because the subpoena was blatantly invalid, it
could not form the basis for the ISP's consent to the defendants' access to
the plaintiffs' communications. 266 In other words, since the ISP's authori-
zation for the defendants' access to the communications was improperly
obtained, it did not qualify as authorization at all.
The court also rejected the defendants' alternative argument that the
communications to which the ISP provided access were not in "electronic
storage," and therefore were not covered by the SCA.267 Section 2701(a)
of the SCA only prohibits obtaining, altering, or preventing authorized ac-
cess to a communication while that communication is in electronic storage
within the provider's facility. 268 Section 2510(17) defines "electronic stor-
age" to include "any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or elec-
tronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof'
and "any storage of such communication by an electronic communication
service for purposes of backup protection of such communication.' 269 The
court acknowledged that other courts have limited application of the term
electronic storage to communications not yet retrieved by the intended re-
259. The plaintiffs also brought Wiretap Act and CFAA claims, which I do not dis-
cuss here.
260. Id. at 982.
261. Id. at 981.
262. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1) (2000).
263. Theofel 1, 341 F.3d at 985.
264. Id. at 983.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 983-84.
267. Id. at 984.
268. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (2000).
269. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
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cipient. 27 The court concluded, however, that communications not deleted
by the recipient and therefore remaining on the ISP's server are stored "for
purposes of backup protection.
'" 271
In response to a petition for rehearing with a suggestion for rehearing
en banc, the court replaced its discussion of "electronic storage" with a
lengthier discussion reaching the same result.272 In. particular, the court
rejected a suggestion by the United States in an amicus brief that the
court's interpretation of "electronic storage" rendered substantial portions
of the SCA irrelevant.273
Notwithstanding the egregiousness of the defendants' conduct, the
court of appeals's effort to extend the SCA to reach the conduct is prob-
lematic for several reasons. First, § 2701 (a) of the SCA requires a showing
that a defendant gained unauthorized access to a facility through which an
electronic communication service is provided. In this case, the relevant
facility presumably would have been the service provider's mail servers.
But the defendants never gained access to that facility at all. Instead, the
service provider copied the e-mail messages in question and made them
separately available to the defendants on a website.274 As to the website,
even if it were a "facility through which an electronic communication ser-
vice is provided" for purpose of § 2701(a), the defendants' access was au-
thorized: the service provider supplied the defendants with the link to the
site. The service provider could just as easily have printed the communica-
tions and mailed them to the defendants. The court of appeals's applica-
tion of § 2701(a) and its discussion of common law trespass gives one the
impression that the defendants gained access to mailboxes on the service
provider's servers dedicated to the plaintiffs' use, but that is simply not the
case. In other words, the court took great pains to explain why defendants'
access was unauthorized, when there was no "access" to the provider's
mail servers at all.
In addition, on the issue of electronic storage, the Ninth Circuit's in-
terpretation reflects a strained reading of the statutory text. The definition
of "electronic storage" implies that, in a determination of whether a com-
270. TheofelI,341 F.3dat985.
271. Id.
272. TheofelII, 359 F.3d at 1069-70, 1076-77.
273. Id. at 1076. 1 alluded earlier to the government's view that messages held by a
server after retrieval by a subscriber are no longer in electronic storage with the provider
of an electronic communication service; if held by a public provider they are instead
merely "held or maintained" by the provider of a remote computing service. See supra




munication is in backup protection, the relevant perspective is that of the
service provider, not the user. The provision covers storage by the elec-
tronic communication service for purposes of backup protection. More-
over, the term "backup" presupposes the creation of a second copy of a
communication. A user who simply chooses not to delete a communica-
tion may wish to continue to store the communication, but he or she is not
actually "backing up" the communication. The court also completely over-
looked the relevance of the fact that the defendants simply gained access
to a web-based database for which the provider supplied a link rather than
to the provider's mail server. There is no theory under which data indefi-
nitely maintained on a website is in "temporary, intermediate storage" "in-
cidental to its transmission." And the service provider's purpose in copy-
ing the communications to a web server was quite obviously not to pro-
vide backup protection, but to make the communications available to the
defendants.
C. The Unraveling of Privacy-Protective Approaches
The cases above reflect instances of courts aggressively interpreting
surveillance law statutes in a privacy-protective way in response to bad
facts. Even when courts' approaches do not result in an ultimate ruling in
favor of the party challenging a particular practice, they constrain other
parties' behavior or mark an incremental step toward an ultimate ruling in
favor of plaintiffs challenging similar practices. One might argue that
courts' approaches are perfectly appropriate-that courts can and should
aggressively interpret electronic surveillance statutes, particularly in light
of the fact that technological changes have made it difficult to apply those
statutes. There are serious difficulties with such a view, however. First, as
this section illustrates, some privacy-protective approaches are sufficiently
vulnerable on statutory interpretation grounds that they are likely to un-
ravel. Second, as discussed in Section D, decisions that appear to be pri-
vacy-protective can derail momentum for legislative change-even when
the decisions are sufficiently tailored to specific factual disputes that they
are unlikely to affect a broad class of privacy threats.
United States v. Smith275 provides a useful example of a case in which
an approach that appeared to be privacy-protective ultimately unraveled.
Congress, of course, amended the definition of wire communication in the
27
SCA so as to overturn the specific result of the Smith case. 76 Both beforeand after Congress's action, however, the Ninth Circuit wrestled with the
275. 155 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1998).
276. See supra notes 198-206 and accompanying text; infra notes 290-293 and ac-
companying text.
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implications of Smith for cases involving private acquisition of electronic
communications. The result was eventual abandonment of the Smith ap-
proach with respect to the Wiretap Act.
Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.2 7 7 involved claims that a Hawaiian
Airlines supervisor violated both the Wiretap Act and the SCA by obtain-
ing communications from the password-restricted portions of an em-
ployee's website. Konop, a pilot for Hawaiian Airlines, created and main-
tained a website where he posted bulletins critical of his employer and un-
ion officials. 278 Although the site was password-restricted, a Hawaiian
Airlines supervisor, Davis, gained access to it by using the user names and
passwords of employees who could legitimately use the site.279 Konop
claimed that the supervisor's conduct violated both the Wiretap Act's pro-
hibition on interception of communications and the SCA's prohibition on
accessing a facility without authorization and thereby "obtain[ing] . . . a
communication in electronic storage" in that facility.
27°
In its first decision in the Konop case (Konop 1), the Ninth Circuit ap-
plied Smith's holding with respect to wire communications to the elec-
tronic communications at issue. 28 As noted above, Smith's endorsement
of prior precedent concluding that an electronic communication can only
be intercepted during transmission, coupled with its adoption of a defini-
tion of interception that covered acquisition of stored wire communica-
tions, created an anomaly: the term "intercept" had two different meanings
depending on whether wire or electronic communications were at issue.
28 2
The Konop I court acknowledged this problem,28 3 but rather than recog-
nizing the error of the Smith case, the court concluded that an electronic
communication need not be acquired while in transmission to be inter-
cepted for purposes of the Wiretap Act: "[T]he Wiretap Act protects elec-
tronic communications from interception when stored to the same extent
as when in transit.
', 284
Significant problems exist with the approach of the Konop I court,
both on a practical level and as a matter of statutory interpretation. If ac-
quisition of an electronic communication in storage constitutes an inter-
277. 236 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Konop 1], withdrawn, 262 F.3d 972
(9th Cir. 2001), new opinion filed, 302 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002) [hereinafter Konop I].
278. Konop 1, 236 F.3d at 1041.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 1040.
281. Id. at 1046.
282. See supra notes 224-228 and accompanying text.
283. 236 F.3d at 1044.
284. Id. at 1046.
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ception, then law enforcement officials would presumably need a full Title
III order to acquire access to such communications. But requiring the gov-
ernment to seek a Title III order to acquire stored electronic communica-
tions would render the governmental access provisions of the SCA
285
meaningless, since law enforcement officials presumably could not use
them. Moreover, the Konop court failed to consider the implications of
extending Smith's reasoning not only to ordinary electronic communica-
tions such as e-mail, but also to files held on a web server. Under the court
of appeals' theory, any acquisition of such material against the wishes of
the operator of the web server might constitute an interception for pur-
poses of the Wiretap Act.28 6 Perhaps concerned about this fact, the court
emphasized that two exceptions would limit application of the Wiretap
Act to viewing of a website: § 251 l(2)(g)(i)'s exception for accessing an
electronic communication "made through an electronic communication
system that is configured so that such electronic communication is readily
accessible to the general public," and § 251 1(2)(d)'s exception for acquisi-
tion of a communication where "one of the parties to the communication
has given prior consent to such interception." 287 Because Konop's site was
configured to require a password, neither exception applied. And even
though Davis accessed the site by using the password of another pilot who
did have authority to view Konop's posting, the court concluded that the
other pilot was not in fact a "party" to the communication, because that
pilot never actually participated in any communication with Konop.
288
In light of the practical and interpretive difficulties, the Konop I
court's decision was understandably the target of a petition for rehearing,
and the court ultimately withdrew its opinion and abandoned its problem-
atic reading of the Wiretap Act. The superseding opinion followed the line
of cases, acknowledged in Smith, holding that interception of an electronic
communication occurs only during the communication's transmission.
289
By the time the court of appeals reconsidered the case, the USA Patriot
Act had eliminated the phrase "in electronic storage" from the definition
of a wire communication. 290 The Konop II court therefore believed that it
could, without disturbing the reasoning of Smith, abandon its previous
conclusion that stored electronic communications could be intercepted.291
285. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
286. SeeKonop1, 236 F.3d at 1040.
287. Id. at 1046-47.
288. Id. at 1047.
289. Konop II, 302 F.3d at 878.
290. Id. at 877 n.5, 878; see also supra notes 198-206 and accompanying text.
291. See id. at 877-78.
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Of course, the USA Patriot Act did not in any way affect the definition of
the term "intercept," so there remained a strong argument that the Smith
court's interpretation of that term (if correct) should still control. The dis-
sent so argued, 292 although, as I have shown above, the Smith court's in-
terpretation simply was erroneous and should have been more explicitly
abandoned.293
Smith and Konop raise another interesting point about why aggressive
interpretations of electronic surveillance statutes ultimately fail to provide
greater privacy protection. The fact that surveillance statutes restrain both
private parties and the government proves to be a double-edged sword.
Because privacy-protective outcomes will constrain the government, the
Justice Department has a significant incentive to oppose them. Indeed, the
Justice Department, as amicus curiae, was one of the main proponents of
rehearing both Konop and Theofel. The Justice Department's brief in Ko-
nop forcefully objected to the fact that, under that case's reasoning, the
government would have to secure Title III orders before accessing stored
communications-when the SCA clearly contemplated government access
upon presentation of a search warrant (or, in some cases, a subpoena or
special court order). Similarly, the Theofel court's conclusion that com-
munications retained in a user's mailbox can be in backup storage
prompted a petition for reconsideration by the government arguing that the
court's interpretation would render portions of the SCA meaningless.294
To be sure, the government's incentives in this context are quite com-
plicated. To the extent that the government succeeds in pressing for inter-
pretations of surveillance statutes that allow for greater government access
to communications, it constrains its own ability to prosecute bad actors.295
292. Id. at 891 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
293. While reversing its problematic reading of the Wiretap Act, the Konop II court
adopted an equally strained reading of the SCA. As discussed earlier, the SCA prohibits
one from intentionally accessing without authorization a facility through which an elec-
tronic communication service is provided, or exceeding an authorization to access that
facility, and thereby "obtain[ing], alter[ing], or prevent[ing] authorized access to a wire
or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage in such system." 18 U.S.C.
§ 2701(a)(1) (2000). Konop claimed that Davis's viewing of material posted on his web-
site violated this provision. Applying this statutory framework to websites, however, is
fraught with some of the same problems discussed with respect to spyware and the cookie
cases. See supra notes 151-167 and accompanying text. A detailed discussion of this as-
pect of Konop H is beyond the scope of this Article.
294. See supra notes 273-274 and accompanying text.
295. For an argument that the dual nature of the Wiretap Act successfully limits ag-
gressive government interpretations of the statute, see Paul K. Ohm, Parallel-Effect Stat-
utes and E-Mail "Warrants ": Reframing the Internet Surveillance Debate, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 1599, 1603 (2004).
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The Scarfo and Ropp cases well illustrate that point: the government's ar-
gument in Scarfo that its keystroke monitor did not require a Title III order
played a prominent role in the Ropp court's conclusion that a private
party's use of a keystroke monitor did not violate the Wiretap Act.2 96 The
fact that the government both prosecutes offenses under and is constrained
by application of the surveillance statutes can therefore act as a disciplin-
ing force. Indeed, the Councilman case provides a prominent example of a
case in which the government opposed an interpretation of the Wiretap
Act that would have been quite favorable to its interests. The district court
and First Circuit panel majority essentially held that the Wiretap Act does
not cover communications briefly stored at any point prior to being made
available to the recipient.2 97 Under the courts' reasoning, the government
would not need to apply for a full Title III order before obtaining such
communications; it could instead proceed under the less protective provi-
sions of the SCA, which at most would require a search warrant. 298 The
government nevertheless sought reversal of the decisions.
Despite the complexity of the government's incentives, the fact that
the effects of too-aggressive interpretations of surveillance statutes will
profoundly affect government investigations means that such interpreta-
tions will not go unchallenged.
D. The Impetus for Legislative Change
Apart from the instability of case law that aggressively interprets elec-
tronic surveillance statutes, such case law has potentially harmful effects
on the momentum for legislative change. Here, the Pharmatrak case pro-
vides a useful example. Nearly all the cookie cases decided prior to Phar-
matrak resulted in dismissal or summary judgment. To be sure, those
cases could have more plainly shown how poor the fit was between the
surveillance law statutes and the conduct complained of in those cases.
299
But to the extent that the conduct complained of in those cases was norma-
tively objectionable (and I do not intend to express an opinion on this
point), the dismissals made it more likely that such conduct would have
been the subject of legislative attention, perhaps to develop a tailored data
privacy statute. When a case such as Pharmatrak is decided, however, it
appears that surveillance statutes are in fact successful in combating data
privacy challenges posed by the Internet, rendering the need for a legisla-
tive response far less urgent.
296. See supra notes 93-113 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 114, 183-189 and accompanying text.
298. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 230-253 and accompanying text.
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Indeed, it is not difficult to envision the same phenomenon occurring
with the Councilman case. The First Circuit panel majority's decision in
June of 2004 was quickly condemned in the popular press, and a legisla-
tive fix was introduced soon after.30 0 Councilman served an extremely
useful function of bringing attention to the problems that arise at the inter-
section of the Wiretap Act and the SCA. The problems were in fact far
more significant than popular accounts of the Councilman case suggested.
In particular, although the district court and panel majority were quite
clearly wrong to conclude that communications move in and out of the
Wiretap Act's protective umbrella during transmission, depending on
whether they are between or within computers transmitting them, a sig-
nificant privacy problem lurks even now that the Councilman decision has
been reversed by the en banc court. Because the defendant in Councilman
acted as the provider of an e-mail service, he would have been entitled to
access the communications in question as soon as the communications
were made available in the system for retrieval by the subscriber. Even
though such communications would have been in "electronic storage" in
the provider's system for purposes of § 2701(a) of the SCA,0
§ 2701(c)(1) provides that the prohibition does not apply with respect to
conduct authorized by the service provider.30 2 In other words, Council-
man's conduct clearly should have been covered by the Wiretap Act be-
cause the communications were seized prior to delivery to the subscriber's
mailbox; but had Councilman only waited to seize the communications
until they were stored in the subscriber's mailbox, retrieval of those com-
munications would have been perfectly legal as a matter of federal law.
The overturning of Councilman is a welcome result, but it has one unfor-
tunate consequence: sapping much of the legislative momentum for recon-
sidering the intersection of the Wiretap Act and the SCA.
V. CONCLUSION
The prospects for using surveillance law to effect a significant change
in spyware practices are quite limited. Although surveillance law may cur-
tail extreme forms of spyware (if courts overcome obstacles that current
case law imposes), a range of seemingly invasive practices will be unaf-
fected, and there is virtually no prospect of reforming industry practices
through surveillance law litigation.
The spyware story is simply not unusual. Plaintiffs have sought to use
300. See, e.g., H.R. 4977, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R. 4956, 108th Cong. (2004).
301. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (2000).
302. Id. § 2701(c)(1).
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surveillance law statutes to address a number of digital-age privacy prob-
lems. In many cases, such efforts have failed. Perhaps more damaging,
however, are some of the cases in which such efforts have succeeded. Ag-
gressive privacy-protective approaches to surveillance law statutes do not
last; they give a false sense that existing law is adequate; and they derail
momentum for much-needed legislative change, both with respect to sur-
veillance law itself and with respect to specific data privacy problems such
as spyware. As I have suggested, we would do better simply to make sur-
veillance law's limits plain.
